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This Article presents three illustrative cases concerning as-
bestosis, boxing titles, and balance billing by physicians. Each
case poses a factually unique question, but the three questions
are substantively similar. The primary focus is on the substan-
tive issues common to the three problem cases:
Asbestosis: Who decides, and how, whether asbestos
hazards were knowable to the industry in the 1930s?
Boxing Titles: Who decides, and how, whether a boxing as-
sociation is engaging in state action, subject to due process re-
quirements, when it awards or withdraws World Championship
titles?
Balance Bills: Who decides, and how, whether the availa-
bility of medical care to the elderly will be substantially re-
duced if courts allow enforcement of a statute prohibiting
physicians from billing Medicare patients for the balance of the
physician's ordinary charges above the charges approved by
regulatory authorities?
To help establish a base point from which to consider the
1. "The time has come," the Walrus said,
"To talk of many things:
Of shoes--and ships-and sealing wax-
Of cabbages-and kings-
And why the sea is boiling hot-
And whether pigs have wings."
L. CARROLL, ALIcE IN WONDERLAND 142 (D. Gray 1971).
I borrowed this verse verbatim from an Englishman, Lewis Carroll, a
well-known creator of verse that grown-up children, wise in the ways of the
world, like to read to their grandchildren. Lewis Carroll was not a rival of
Charles Dickens as a critic of the legal system. Also, I acknowledge that I
have never felt that I fully understood this verse, either as literature or as
commentary. Still, it inspires me to parody, which I use to introduce three
problem cases.
The time has come, it must be said,
To talk of asbestosis, [Case One]
Of Marquis's rules for boxing rings, [Case Two)
And accurate prognosis
Of legal rules for balance bills, [Case Three]
And knowing by osmosis.
How who knows facts that make the law
Controlling any matter,
Including what the experts say
When in the courts they spat, or
Who decides the law and facts-
Especially the latter.
The meaning of this parody may be no clearer on first reading than the
meaning of "whether pigs have wings." I hope to clarify both matters.
"Knowing by osmosis," as I shall explain more fully in the Article, is a
metaphorical description of unexplained "judicial notice."
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three problem cases, I ask the reader to agree or disagree with
two propositions. Both propositions concern who should decide
disputed facts in jury trials in the United States.2
First Proposition: In United States jury trials, if judge and
jury perform their respective functions well, the jury ordinarily
decides all genuine disputes of fact that are material to disposi-
tion of the case.
Second Proposition: Under United States law, any party to
a dispute over a material fact is entitled to have a jury3 decide
that issue unless, on the evidence received in the trial court, ju-
rors could not reasonably differ about the answer.4
II. ILLUSTRATIVE PROBLEM CASES5
A. CASE ONE: ASBESTOSIS
Numerous plaintiffs filed claims in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey for personal injury
caused by exposure to asbestos products.6 In many of these
cases defendants asserted a "state-of-the-art" defense against
strict products liability. If a court recognizes the defense, a de-
fendant may escape liability for an injury caused by the defend-
ant's product. The defendant, however, must prove that,
although defective by present-day standards of knowledge and
understanding, the product measured up to the state of the art
at the time it was manufactured.
The New Jersey Supreme Court had rejected the defense
shortly before the cases were filed. The defendants, however,
challenged on a federal constitutional ground the New Jersey
judge-made law precluding use of the defense. 7 Plaintiffs ar-
2. In reacting to them, put aside the exceptional cases traced historically
to equity and other exceptions for claims of statutory origin, such as those for
worker's compensation benefits.
3. This proposition assumes that the party makes a timely demand for
jury trial.
4. The audience in attendance at the William B. Lockhart Lecture, at
which these two propositions were stated, voted overwhelmingly that they
agreed with both propositions. The aim of this Article, as it was for the lec-
tire, is to persuade you that you should disagree with both propositions.
5. Cases strikingly like two of these cases-the second and third-came
before one particular trial judge who sits in the District of Massachusetts. In
some respects, these two cases, and others stated in an Appendix to this
Article, have been hypothetically modified to permit less-inhibited comment
than might otherwise seem appropriate.
6. E.g., In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
7. The district court consolidated the pending asbestos cases for argu-
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gued that because the New Jersey Supreme Court had not cre-
ated a special rule precluding the use of the state-of-the-art
defense for asbestosis cases, the defendants had based their con-
stitutional claims on an erroneous premise. Rather, plaintiffs
argued, the Supreme Court had merely determined as a fact
that the hazards of asbestos exposure were knowable to the in-
dustry at all relevant times. Therefore, plaintiffs alleged, it was
this factual determination and not a special legal rule that pre-
cluded application of the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos
cases.
If plaintiffs' argument is correct, the answer to the ques-
tion "who decides" whether asbestos hazards were knowable in
the 1930s is the Supreme Court of New Jersey. Should the fed-
eral courts accept that answer?
B. CASE Two: BOXING TnrES
On April 1, 1987, Marvelous Marvin Hagler filed suit
against the World Boxing Association (WBA) in a Massachu-
setts court.8 Hagler moved for an order restraining defendant
from withdrawing the World Championship title it had
awarded him. A superior court justice entered a temporary re-
straining order and set the matter for prompt hearing on the
motion for preliminary injunction. Defendant then removed
the case to federal court.
Hagler claimed that the procedure the WBA would apply
to withdraw his title denied him the due process guaranteed
under the fourteenth amendment. The fourteenth amendment,
however, declares that states shall not deny due process;9 it
does not constrain private entities or individuals who are not
performing a state function. One of the plaintiff's many claims
ment and disposition of the federal constitutional issue. Because the district
court, sitting en banc, was closely divided, the following question was certified
to the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b):
do "decisions of the New Jersey Supreme Court violate the Equal Protection
Clause in abolishing the state-of-the-art defense in asbestos personal injury
cases" while still allowing that defense in other product liability cases, includ-
ing drug cases? 829 F.2d at 1235.
8. Hagler filed suit with the Clerk of the Probate and Family Court of
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, in Brockton, where he resided, which
was the same court that some years earlier had granted Hagler's petition to
change his name officially to Marvelous Marvin Hagler. The defendant re-
moved to the United States district court. Hagler v. World Boxing Ass'n, No.
87-372-K (D. Mass. Apr. 1, 1987) (denial of preliminary injunction), aff'd, No.
87-1245 (1st Cir. Apr. 2, 1987).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
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was that the WBA's procedures for awarding and terminating
titles were so intertwined with state regulation of boxing in Ne-
vada, Massachusetts, and elsewhere that the WBA's action was
state action for fourteenth amendment purposes.10
Question: Who decides, and how, whether the WBA en-
gages in state action subject to due process requirements when
it awards or withdraws World Championship titles?
C. CASE THREE: BALANCE BILLING BY PHYSICIANS
Plaintiffs1' challenged the constitutionality of a state stat-
ute prohibiting balance billing as violative of the supremacy
clause.' 2 Balance billing occurs when a physician bills a patient
for the balance of the physician's usual charge for services that
is more than the amount that Medicare or some other insurer
has paid.' 3 Plaintiffs contend that the statute, if upheld, will
substantially reduce the availability of medical care to the eld-
erly and that this result is directly contrary to the congres-
sional intent objectively manifested in the enactment of the
Medicare Act.14
At trial, the parties called expert witnesses to present testi-
10. As you will recall, many of our American states have determined that
the rules for the gentlemanly sport of boxing developed by the Marquis of
Queensberry are inadequate to meet modern American concerns. That ex-
plains why there is, at least to some extent, state action in the regulation of
boxing rings. E.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, paras. 5001-5026 (1987); MINN. STAT.
§ 341.01.15 (1986); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 317.001-.021 (1983); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 68-50-101 to -303 (1987 & Supp. 1988); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8501-1
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
11. Plaintiffs were the Massachusetts Medical Society, the American Med-
ical Association, and a Massachusetts physician.
12. Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass.),
aff'd, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
13. Patients also pay the 20% "co-insurance" required by Medicare, but
that co-payment is a "reasonable charge" and billing the patient for it is not
"balance billing" according to the state statute.
14. Different perspectives on congressional intent are expressed in the
several opinions in Thompson v. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. 513 (1988). I am delib-
erately using the phrase congressional intent objectively manifested in the en-
actment of the statute. Not surprisingly, the arguments advanced by the
parties included some that were cast in a different terminology that reason-
ably may be understood as involving a standard concerned witha state of mind
of Congress, or members of Congress, rather than an objective standard such
as I believe to be appropriate. The whole set of issues regarding legislative in-
tent is a large subject that I do not explore here and have barely touched else-
where. See EEOC v. Massachusetts, 680 F. Supp. 455, 457-60 (D. Mass.), aff'd,
858 F.2d 52 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Vest, 639 F. Supp. 899, 902-12 (D.
Mass. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1987); Keeton, Statutes, Gaps, and Val-
ues in Tort Law, 44 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1, 7-9 (1978); see also infra note 148.
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mony bearing on disputed fact questions about the likely effect
a prohibition against balance billing of Medicare patients would
have on the availability of medical service for the elderly, given
physicians' publicized threats to withdraw from the state. The
court received some of this expert opinion testimony subject to
objections under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court de-
ferred the evidentiary ruling to consider the implications of the
distinction between adjudicative and nonadjudicative facts.1 5
Question: Who decides, and how, whether enforcement of
the statute will substantially reduce the availability of medical
care to the elderly?
Each of the illustrative cases raises a principal question:
Who decides, and how, whether something is true? To deter-
mine whether or not something is true, one must consider
fact 16 questions. In contrast, to the extent that we are thinking
about who decides and how, we are thinking about allocations
of power (who?) and methods of exercising power (how?).1 7
15. I have just used the phrase ad udicative facts. Administrative law and
evidence treatises and Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence have used
this phrase. Quickly and roughly defined, adjudicative facts are simply the
kinds of facts we ordinarily ask the jury to decide in jury trials. Who did what
to whom, when, where, and how? Was the light red? Was the defendant neg-
ligent? Is the person in the courtroom as a defendant the same person who
stuck a gun in the teller's face at the bank? These kinds of questions are adju-
dicative-fact questions. All other fact questions are nonadjudicative-fact
questions.
16. I use fact as it is used in ordinary discourse.
17. For Case One, involving asbestosis, I will add, by way of illustration, a
few explicit subsidiary questions-allocational and methodological-that we
will need to think about in order to determine who decides and how. How do
the decision makers, whoever they may be, go about deciding whether asbestos
hazards were knowable in the 1930s? What kinds of evidence or record or
other basis for deciding should decision makers consider? Should they con-
sider affidavits or oral testimony of witnesses who are experts? If so, experts
in what? Should they consider evidence that a single researcher published an
article on the subject in a stated year? That within a decade several more arti-
cles appeared in trade journals and academic journals? Should they consider
the findings made in previously tried cases in which a jury or a court found
(1) that the hazards of asbestos exposure were known to a particular defend-
ant manufacturer of asbestos products in a particular time period-for exam-
ple, the 1930s-or (2) that the hazards were knowable in that time period and
could have been discovered had manufacturers made reasonable inquiry? Will
the answers to all these methodological questions bear also upon the alloca-
tional question of who should decide?
Consider also the following methodological questions, framed in relation
to Case Three, involving the predicted effect of a ban on balance billing by
physicians. What evidence or record should the trial court consider? Should
the court exclude from consideration all evidence that would be objectionable
on hearsay or other grounds under the Federal Rules of Evidence, even if the
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III. THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT AND THE
WORDS18 USED TO DESCRIBE IT
This Article concerns facts that serve as premises-premise
facts.19 More precisely, these are facts that explicitly or implic-
itly serve as premises used to decide issues of law.20 The term
premise facts is not limited to those about which society is in
agreement. Premise facts include all facts that serve as prem-
ises for decisions of issues of law-even when one'or more of
these facts is genuinely in dispute.21 Moreover, after a court or
very same evidence was considered by the legislative committee that recom-
mended enactment of the statute? Should the court exclude expert opinion
testimony in the absence of a showing both that the expert had appropriate
qualifications and that the subject matter of the opinions was a subject as to
which expert opinion testimony may properly be received under the Federal
Rules of Evidence? Should the trial court make explicit findings of fact, pur-
suant to Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure? If it does, will these
findings be controlling unless set aside by a higher court under the clearly er-
roneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?
18. We may define words any way we wish. We cannot, however, control
how others interpret them. Our choice of words is thus significant. The ways
others use and understand the chosen words may have a stronger influence
than the way we define those words.
19. The two contrasting terms, adjudicative facts (for those we usually
submit to juries in jury trials) and premise facts, occupy almost the entire field
of fact disputes. One reason for saying "almost, but not entirely" is the exist-
ence of a subset of fact disputes that a court must resolve in order to deter-
mine the admissibility of evidence bearing on adjudicative facts, pursuant to
special provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See infra note 185 and ac-
companying text. Perhaps a dispute about the citizenship of a party, when rel-
evant to diversity of citizenship and decided under a motion made pursuant to
Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is another instance in
which the fact is plainly not a premise fact but also is either not adjudicative
or at least is not decided in the way adjudicative facts are usually decided (by
the jury, in a jury trial).
20. This relationship to issues of law explains why I have been attracted
in the past to the possibility of calling such facts issue-of-law facts, and have
done so occasionally. I use premise facts and issue-of-law facts with exactly
the same meaning.
21. Despite my preference for using the term premise facts in the broad
sense I have described, I wish to note that in the most familiar and most com-
monly discussed contexts such facts are identified as legislative facts. I wish to
invoke and to build upon the very substantial body of knowledge and under-
standing that has been developed under the rubric of legislative fact. For
these reasons, I have chosen the title, Legislative Facts and Similar Things,
and the subtitle, Deciding Disputed Premise Facts.
I gratefully acknowledge that the Honorable Frank Coffin first suggested
that I use the term premise facts should I persist, as I have done, in searching
for another term rather than using legislative facts in a sense broad enough to
encompass all that I propose to discuss in this Article. In the interest of disclo-
sure, I report also that Professor Kenneth Davis is critical, in a vigorous
though entirely friendly way, of my reluctance to use legislative facts through-
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legislative body decides on the premise facts, they are premise
facts even if many people believe the asserted factual premises
do not justify the legal decision.
The Article will discuss not only legislative facts which leg-
islatures use as premises to enact statutes, but also lawmaking
facts, which courts use as premises to make law when deciding
issues of first impression or when overruling precedent.22 The
out, and explicitly with a meaning as broad as that which I propose for prem-
ise facts. Certainly it is true that the phrase legislative facts often is used with
a very broad meaning that extends at least to facts used in lawmaking by
courts and other entities as well as lawmaking by legislatures, if not to all the
contexts I mean to include within the term premise facts.
22. The term lawmaking facts is not novel. Professor Kenneth Davis has
referred to some categories of facts as "facts in lawmaking." He uses the term
lawmaking, however, in a sense that differs from that used here. Davis, Facts
in Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 931.32 (1980) [hereinafter Davis, Facts];
see also Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Pro-
posed Research Service for the Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986)
[hereinafter Davis, Proposed Research Service]. The more common usage is to
refer to all facts that are used in legal decision making as legislative facts.
Professor Kenneth Davis first suggested this usage almost fifty years ago. Da-
vis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARV. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 15:4 (2d ed. 1980). This usage is widely accepted, even if sometimes criticized,
see, e.g., E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 328, 331 (3d ed. 1984); 1 J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 200[03] (1986); 9 WIGMORE
ON EVIDENCE § 2565(b) (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1981); Davis, "There is a Book Out
. . . ": An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 1539, 1542 (1987) [hereinafter Davis, Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts]; Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and Es-
tablishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 482-88 (1986); see gen-
erally Walker & Monahan, Social Facts: Scientific Methodology as Legal
Precedent, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 877 (1988); Walker & Monahan, Social
Frameworks: A New Use of Social Science in Law, 73 VA. L. REV. 559 (1987). I
am uneasy, however, about misunderstandings that may arise from using the
term legislative facts to describe not only those premises a legislature uses to
enact a statute but also those that a court uses for judicial lawmaking. For
this reason, I will ordinarily refer to the latter as lawmaking facts. I will use
the term premise facts with a broad meaning that includes legislative facts in
the narrower sense as well as lawmaking facts as I have just explained the
term.
I do not criticize the usage Professor Davis and others have advanced. In-
deed, that usage seems quite appropriate for the contexts in which it most
commonly appears. But facts that serve as premises for enactment of statutes
serve a function similar to that of facts that serve as premises for judicial deci-
sions, including not only those regarding validity and interpretation of legisla-
tion but also decisions on other kinds of issues of law. For the purpose of
expressing clearly and unambiguously the ideas I wish to present in this arti-
cle, I hope that using both premise facts and lawmaking facts, which are simi-
lar to but somewhat different from premises for enactment of legislation, will
prove to be preferable to using legislative facts with a meaning broad enough
to include all the things I propose to consider. I hope my usage will be less
1988]
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Article uses the term lawmaking facts to make the point that
such facts have a force of their own, independent of the credi-
bility and influence of the people and institutions that recog-
nize them, 23 only in decision making.2 4 Although facts that are
potentially lawmaking facts have an inherent force of their
own,25 they do not become lawmaking facts until human inter-
vention occurs-until a court or some other entity uses them as
premises for deciding an issue of law.26 Thus, no facts are ever
lawmaking facts until a lawmaking entity proclaims them to be
such by explicitly or implicitly using them as premises when
deciding an issue of law.27
likely to inhibit open-minded probing and will contribute a little to deeper un-
derstanding both of lawmaking by courts and other kinds of judicial decision
making that I will describe below.
23. Of course, lawmaking facts achieve greater influence to the extent
that the people and institutions that recognize and use them have power and
influence. But lawmaking facts are likely to have their day, even if that day
happens to be a long time coming.
24. Because premise facts in general, and lawmaking facts in particular,
have a force of their own, I agree with the observation of Professors John
Monahan and Laurens Walker that such facts are aptly described as being a
kind of authority to which courts may properly turn for guidance in deciding
issues of law. See Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 488-95. I have a con-
cern, however, that describing the reports of social science research as social
authority, as Monahan and Walker do, may lead to overlooking the important
distinction between what the social science research reports say about the
studied phenomena, on the one hand, and the underlying phenomena them-
selves, on the other hand. Moreover, the term social authority embraces only
one subcategory of all the premise facts that have the quality of authority to
which courts may properly turn in deciding issues of law.
25. Lest I be misunderstood as overstating the independent force of law-
making facts, I remind you of a story that illustrates by analogy a limitation on
their power. A minister called on a member of his flock who was an avid gar-
dener. It was springtime and the flowering shrubs and plants, all in orderly
arrangement, were at the peak of their beauty. The gardener was also a bee-
keeper, and his bees were at work tending the blossoms and discouraging visi-
tors from reaching out to pluck them. The minister approached the gardener
at work and said, "This is a very beautiful garden that you and the Lord have
created." Rising from his work and wiping the sweat from his brow, the gar-
dener replied quietly, "Yes, pastor. And you should have seen it when the
Lord had it all alone."
26. Such facts may be, though are not always, facts of the kind that are
because they are, without regard to whether any human proclamation has oc-
curred. The distinction between facts that are because they are-for example,
facts about the physical characteristics of ladyslippers and bluebonnets-and
facts that are by reason of human proclamation-for example, the facts as to
whether or not ladyslippers and bluebonnets are officially the state flowers of
Minnesota and Texas respectively-is another large and interesting subject
that I do not explore in this Article.
27. The law that lawmaking facts help to produce therefore is more beau-
tiful to behold when the inherent force of those facts is aided by wise human
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This Article also emphasizes the scope of the influence of
premise facts-legislative facts and similar things. Premise
facts influence decisions by all kinds of decision makers, when-
ever they decide legal issues. Premise facts have influence
when legislatures enact statutes, when courts set precedents,
when administrative agencies make decisions that guide later
decisions, and when any institution adopts official rules for
practice, procedure, or decision making. Premise facts also in-
fluence other decisions such as the admissibility of expert opin-
ion testimony bearing on adjudicative-fact disputes.28
Premise facts are foundation facts. They are building
blocks in the foundation on which the whole structure of rea-
son is built for deciding cases. They are fundamental facts rele-
vant to many cases, not just the case before the court. Premise
facts, therefore, is shorthand for facts that serve as premises for
deciding an issue of law. They are facts that serve as premises
in the reasoned explanation of the decision of a legal issue.
In Case Three, for example, the court must determine
whether settled doctrines of federal preemption apply to the
Massachusetts anti-balance-billing statute and whether that
statute is inconsistent with the federal Medicare Act.29 We do
not ordinarily call this kind of court decision "legislating" or
even "lawmaking." If the court's decision depends on how dis-
puted facts are decided, the court will decide a disputed prem-
ise fact. Thus, premise facts include not only legislative facts
that a legislature decides and lawmaking facts that a court de-
cides when making new law or overruling precedent, but also
facts decided as a premise for a reasoned decision applying set-
tled law, as in Case Three.30
intervention. Indeed, the principal themes of this Article concern wise and re-
spectful human intervention.
The concept that lawmaking facts have an inherent influence of their own
is closely associated with the idea of "government by laws," cf. MASS. CONST.
pt. I, art. XXX, in contrast with government by individuals. With all our
human imperfections, we shall come closer to our ideal of justice if we do our
best to seek justice through a system of law, in which all officials who have
any share in the responsibility for doing justice are bound to perform their re-
spective functions within the constraints of law. Unrestrained discretion to
mete out justice according to one's own idiosyncratic views is the power to be
arbitrary and capricious, even if one's views are firmly founded in moral prin-
ciple and reflect exceptional learning and insight. We shall come closer to our
aim of "government by laws" as we develop a better understanding of lawmak-
ing facts and how we decide disputes about them according to law.
28. See infra notes 182-84 and accompany text.
29. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
30. Another example may help to clarify. In some cases, before a court
1988]
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Premise facts therefore is an expression that seems apt for
both lawmaking in the more general sense and for deciding an
issue of law of the more limited kind concerned with applicabil-
ity of a well-settled rule to a type of circumstance not previ-
ously determined3 ' to be within its scope.3
2
determines the applicability of a settled rule of law, it must decide adjudica-
tive-fact disputes distinctive to the case at hand, and also must elaborate on a
general legal norm. Thus, in applying the settled general norm defining negli-
gence as failure to exercise the care that an ordinarily prudent person would
exercise in the same or similar circumstances, a court may determine that it
should elaborate on that general norm by developing a supplemental norm ap-
plicable to a relatively small class of cases dealing with exceptionally aged per-
sons. Should the court base such a proposed rule on a fixed chronological age
or on some definition of mental and physical capacity? Or should the court
reject a proposal to adopt such a supplemental rule? May the choice depend
on resolving disputed factual assertions about the percentage of the population
that the decision would affect and how it would affect their conduct and their
positions? When a court considers making another subsidiary or implementa-
tional rule of law (with its own factual premises), any subsidiary rule the court
adopts will become precedent, applicable in similar cases. The subsidiary rule,
however, will affect a smaller body of cases than those that the more general
norm affects. When a court acts in this way, it is not merely deciding adjudica-
tive facts that bring the case within the settled rule or that place the case
outside that rule. The court is making law, and almost certainly its decision to
do so is based on disputable factual premises.
Problems of identifying exactly in which of these different ways a court
acts-using facts as adjudicative facts or using them as premise facts-in decid-
ing whether a settled rule of law applies to a particular case are considered in
Appendix, Part III, infra.
31. As a matter of convenience and clarity of communication, I will use
the word determine and its derivatives as broadly including both finding adju-
dicative facts and deciding premise facts. This is compatible with a common
practice of using determinations to include both a trial court's findings of adju-
dicative facts and its conclusions of law. As to a trial court's obligations to
make a record of its findings and conclusions, see FED. R. Civ. P. 52.
32. Professors John Monahan and Laurens Walker have criticized Profes-
sor Kenneth Davis as "tacitly rely[ing] upon a pre-Realist conceptualization of
the difference between fact and law" in his elaboration of the distinction be-
tween legislative facts and adjudicative facts. Monahan & Walker, supra note
22, at 487-88. They may well extend that criticism to the terminology I use.
One may read their article as urging that we describe as law, rather than as
facts in any sense, the determinations that in my terminology serve the func-
tion of premise facts or issue-of-law facts, that is, facts that serve as premises
for a reasoned decision of an issue of law. My response is that I think the ter-
minology I am using, and the somewhat different but quite similar terminol-
ogy Professor Davis and others have used, reflects not a "pre-Realist" but a
"more Realist" view. Not all, but many, of the facts used as premises for de-
ciding issues of law are facts of life in a very deep sense that we cannot change
by changing the label we use. The community speaks of them as facts. We
legal professionals increase our difficulty of communicating with the commu-
nity, and with each other, if we insist on talking about them as if they were
not facts in any sense.
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Finally, this Article speaks of "deciding" premise facts or
lawmaking facts-or "deciding disputes about" premise facts.
Most courts and commentators refer to "finding," rather than
to "deciding" or "determining," facts of this kind. I prefer the
term deciding to finding, to emphasize that the law that bears
on who decides premise facts and how they do it is quite differ-
ent from the law that bears on who finds adjudicative facts and
how. I hope that deciding disputes about premise facts will
convey more accurately the intended meaning than would find-
ing legislative facts.33
I emphasize that I do not suggest that choice of terminol-
ogy should determine the outcomes we reach. Indeed my cen-
tral message is precisely the opposite. I am primarily interested
in inviting you to consider which outcomes we should reach in
answering questions about who decides, and how, and about
why we should reach those outcomes. We may discover good
reasons for answering differently, in different contexts, ques-
tions about who decides and how, even though premise facts
are involved in all the contexts compared.3
IV. PREMISE FACTS: A SUMMARY
The law of premise facts can be summarized in twelve
principles.3 5 Understanding principles is essential to under-
33. I emphasize, however, that this is a choice of expression, and should
not be misunderstood as urging that other terminology is in some way errone-
ous, or even less acceptable. If you prefer to speak of legislative facts, how-
ever, I do urge that you either permit the general extension of the terminology
to all facts used as premises for deciding issues of law, or that you invent some
other terminology to apply when a court is plainly not legislating in any tradi-
tional sense but is deciding an issue of law that bears, for example, on the ap-
plicability of a well-settled constitutional doctrine or an issue of law
determining admissibility of expert testimony. In these circumstances, the
court must first decide a fact dispute in order to decide the issue of law.
34. This conviction that terminology should not control decision making is
forcefully stated in Justice O'Connor's opinion for the United States Supreme
Court in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 113-15 (1985), and by Monaghan, Con-
stitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 229, 234 (1985). Professor
Monaghan explains his use of constitutional fact as often referring to adjudi-
cative rather than to legislative fact. Id- at 253.
35. Professors Austin Scott and Warren Seavey started their draft of the
American Law Institute's Restatement of Restitution, for which they jointly
served as reporters, with a statement of principles of the law of restitution.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 1-3 (1937). Professor Scott later informally
remarked in substance (though I cannot assure you these were the precise
words he used): "a principle is a proposition that is not true, exactly." A prin-




standing the law in action. Principles, even when in conflict,
always influence decisions. Moreover, when decision makers
identify no competing principle, they probably will not recog-
nize an exception to the key principle they invoke.
The first five principles concern characteristics of premise
facts. Principles six through twelve concern practices that
courts currently use to decide disputed premise facts.
A. CHARACTERISTICS OF PREMISE FACTS
1. First Principle: Existence of a Contrast Between Premise
Facts and Adjudicative Facts
For the purpose of determining who decides fact disputes,
and how, the legal system has developed one set of rules and
practices for adjudicative facts and a different set of rules and
practices for premise facts. 36
An impartial observer may suggest that one can find many
exceptions to this first principle-instances in which a court ap-
pears to have used methods characteristic of adjudicative fact
finding to determine premise facts and other instances in which
a court appears to have used premise methods to determine an
adjudicative fact. The evidence referred to in the remainder of
this Article overwhelmingly supports the principle, however,
when one takes it as truly a principle and not as a universal
rule. Some courts nevertheless may have deviated from the
principle, partly because relatively little explicit discussion of
this distinction has appeared in judicial opinions. The devia-
tions therefore may have occurred because of oversight rather
than considered choice.
2. Second Principle: The Distinction Between Premise Facts
and Adjudicative Facts-The Purpose Served by
the Fact Determination
A premise fact is one that serves as a premise for a rea-
soned decision of an issue of law.
Underlying every decision of an issue of law is a set of fac-
tual premises. As Professor Kenneth Davis has stated the point
in relation to judicial lawmaking, "[n]o judge can think about
law, policy, or discretin without using extrarecord facts."37
36. This first principle is basic to the entire subject matter of this Article.
The precedents and commentaries cited in support of other principles also im-
plicitly support this principle.
37. Davis, Proposed Research Service, supra note 22, at 7.
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This observation is partly descriptive. It is not just a state-
ment about what judges should do. It is an observation about
human nature, about what judges do whenever they think
about law.38 The statement is also prescriptive, however. A
judge may consciously limit the use of facts to the facts in the
record. Judges ought not to so restrict their thinking, because
to do so is not to think through a problem fully. This prescrip-
tive point has support in case law. For example, Judge Wein-
stein had before him a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction a New York corporation's claim against a Japanese
corporation. He explained his use of judicial notice-the term
he chose to describe the process of deciding disputes of premise
facts-in the following way:
There is always a danger in the superficial sociological musings of
lawyers and judges who must perforce be relatively ignorant of the
realities underlying the diverse situations with which they must deal
and which they must try to understand. Yet, whether we explore the
economic, political or social settings to which the law must be applied
explicitly, or suppress our assumptions by failing to take note of
them, we cannot apply the law in a way that has any hope of making
sense unless we attempt to visualize the actual world with which it
interacts--and this effort requires judicial notice to educate the court.
A court's power to resort to less well known and accepted sources
of data to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general
evidential hypothesis purposes must be accepted because it is essential
to the judicial process. Here flexible judicial notice is required first,
in interpreting New York [law] and, second, in understanding the re-
lationship of the Japanese parent to its American subsidiaries.
3 9
Judges do come to their roles of judging with knowledge that
has influence on their legal thinking. Descriptively that is so,
whether it is acknowledged or not.40
A set of factual premises underlies each decision of an is-
38. Professor Kenneth Davis made this observation about what judges do
when they think about "law, policy, or discretion." Ic- Of course, when policy
or discretion bears on deciding an issue of law, the addition of these terms does
not change the meaning of the statement. I omit the terms from my observa-
tions about what I call premise facts, however, because a judge may consider
policy and exercise discretion in deciding an evaluative, adjudicative-fact ques-
tion. Using premise-fact methods of decision in such a circumstance may
sometimes be inappropriate.
39. Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co. Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (citation omitted).
40. Prescriptively, I would urge that we acknowledge this fact of life so
we may consider, on the one hand, when and how and to what extent judges
should allow extra-record facts to influence their decision making and, on the
other hand, when and how and to what extent judges should do their best to
constrain or limit the influence of extra-record facts.
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sue of law in all of the following kinds of decisions of issues of
law:
(1) a legislature's decision of a set of issues of law (substan-
tive, procedural, or both) incorporated into a proposed statute
that the legislature enacts or rejects;
(2) a decision by an authorized body adopting regulatory or
procedural rules (including a court's adoption of procedural or
evidentiary rules and an administrative agency's adoption of
regulatory rules);
(3) a court's decision of an issue of first impression or the
overruling of a precedent (of either substantive or procedural
law);
(4) some court decisions determining whether a settled
rule of law applies to an aspect of the case before the court.41
The first three of these subcategories are easily understood
as lawmaking-lawmaking by a legislature enacting a statute,
by a court or agency adopting a set of regulatory rules or rules
of procedure, or by a court deciding an issue of first impression
or overruling precedent. Because each of these instances is a
part of the lawmaking process, deciding the factual premises
for such decisions may aptly be called deciding lawmaking
facts.42
3. Third Principle: The Nature of the Fact in Dispute
is Not Decisive
The nature of the fact in dispute does not determine
whether it is an adjudicative or a premise fact. Both adjudica-
tive and premise-fact disputes may involve either historical or
evaluative assertions of fact about the past or the present, or
predictive or evaluative assertions about the future. Neverthe-
less, premise facts (which are used as premises for deciding is-
sues of law) (a) usually are generalized in nature, (b) often are
evaluative or predictive in nature, or both, and (c) only occa-
sionally are historical in nature.
Each question arising out of the illustrative cases concerns
41. Some special problems regarding this fourth subcategory are discussed
in Appendix III, infra.
42. I was tempted to use the label lawmaking facts more broadly, much as
others have chosen to use the label legislative facts. In the end I was dis-
suaded by the thought that using either label for the fourth subcategory is
likely to invoke concerns about judicial activism that have no relevance to the
subcategory and are more likely to impede than to aid probing inquiry and
candid discussion of the substantive issues that bear upon the fourth as well as
the first three subcategories.
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a premise fact. In the first case, the question of who decides,
and how, whether asbestos hazards were knowable to the in-
dustry in the 1930s, is at least partly a historical determination.
The question is also partly evaluative because one must use an
evaluative standard to determine with what degree of inquiry
and to what groups the hazard was knowable.4 3 The question
concerning state action in Case Two is definitely evaluative.
The question may also, however, involve a dispute about histor-
ical facts. Historical-fact questions might include whether per-
sons in regulated groups had social, political, and economic
contacts with regulators. The question in Case Three concern-
ing the issue of whether enforcement of a statute will reduce
access to medical care is both evaluative and predictive.
It is not the nature of these questions, however, that makes
the facts to be decided premise facts. They are premise facts
because courts use them as premises for deciding issues of law.
Courts use them as foundation facts to make rules of law they
will apply when deciding similar cases, rather than using them
as adjudicative facts that complete the superstructure of rea-
soning to a decision of a particular case.
The question "Who decides and how, whether [something]
is true?" emphasizes that the disputed assertions this body of
law concerns are assertions that, in accordance with common
usage, can be said to be true or false. They are, in this sense,
assertions of fact. The disputed assertions do, however, include
several distinct types of assertions of fact that may be organized
into four categories:
(1) events, commonly called historical facts;
(2) evaluative (interpretive) assertions, sometimes called
evaluative facts;
(3) predictions about future events, which may also be
called predictive event facts;
(4) predictions about future evaluative (interpretive) as-
sertions, which may be called predictive evaluative facts.
It is possible to have a dispute about an event, or historical
fact, that, when decided, serves as a premise for a court's adop-
tion of a rule of law,44 or a legislature's enactment of a statute.
Indeed, legislative bodies sometimes state historical factual
43. This point is developed more fully in Appendix II, infra.
44. For example, to determine whether asbestos hazards were knowable
to the industry in the 1930s, or at some other particular time, a court must de-
cide some historical facts, even though the court also must decide some evalua-
tive facts. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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premises in the text of an introductory section of a statute, and
even more often the legislative history recites such factual
premises. Many historical-fact 45 disputes, however, are those
the determination of which serves to decide a particular case.
These historical-fact determinations serve the function of adju-
dicative facts rather than premise facts. Typical of such dis-
putes concerning historical facts that serve the function of
adjudicative facts are disputes about who did what, when, and
where, and about whether one acted with a defined state of
mind.46
A typical dispute of interpretive or evaluative premise facts
is that in the Third Case, requiring a determination of whether
implementation of a state statute will conflict with the objec-
tively manifested congressional intent in a federal statute. De-
ciding this disputed evaluative-fact question in the Third Case
will serve as a basis for a reasoned decision on the statute's va-
lidity under established federal preemption precedents.4 7
A typical dispute of interpretive or evaluative adjudicative
facts deals with whether a person's act violated a legal standard
for evaluating conduct. A finding that conduct violated a pre-
requisite of liability, such as the negligence standard or the
proximate cause standard, is a finding of adjudicative fact.48 So,
too, is a finding of substantial similarity in a copyright case. 49
The treatment of evaluative-fact issues in tort law illus-
trates that courts determine the purpose for which an evalua-
45. A determination that contrasts with a finding of historical fact is often
described as a finding on a "mixed question of fact and law." The opinion in
O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685 (1st Cir. 1980), illustrates such a
determination. To determine who decides a dispute over an evaluative fact,
and how, one must distinguish between the mixed question of fact and law in
which all factual elements concern adjudicative facts and the mixed question
of fact and law in which one or more of the factual elements concerns premise
facts. The factual element in applying the "substantial similarity" test to a
copyright case, if reasonably disputed, is adjudicative. O'Neill, 630 F.2d at 687.
In contrast, the factual element in deciding the dispute about the future effect
of an anti-balance-billing statute is a premise fact. The distinction lies not in
the nature of the disputed facts, but in the purpose for which the disputed fact
is material under the precedents the court invokes in reaching its decision.
46. FED. R. Evin. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a); see also
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1979) (requiring fact finding as to
state of mind of defendant in criminal case, rather than allowing imposition of
criminal liability for presumed intent).
47. More is said about this in Appendix III, infra.
48. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 291, 431 (1965).
49. See ONeill, 630 F.2d at 687 (concluding that ultimate finding of sub-
stantial similarity in copyright case is mixed question of fact and law, not to be
decided on summary judgment if evidence must be weighed).
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tive determination is made and that this purpose is decisive as
to whether the evaluative determination is in nature an adjudi-
cative-fact finding or a premise-fact decision.50 For example,
50. Judge Becker commented in Asbestos Litigation: "The state-of-the-art
defense decides not what the defendant or another party knew-a fact relating
to a particular party-but what was knowable-a fact about the state of the
world." In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1246 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker,
J., concurring), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
The distinction between facts about the particular case and facts about the
state of the world is an underlying theme of the contrast between adjudicative
and premise facts. Adjudicative facts are material specifically to the case at
hand (case facts or discrete facts) and, in contrast, premise facts bear on the
determination of what legal rule courts should apply to a specific case and
other like cases generally (general facts).
Courts often use the term general, either alone as a modifier of facts or as
part of a phrase describing facts that form the basis for a lawmaking decision.
See, e.g., Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d at 1246 (Becker, J., concurring) (noting
that "there were or may have been data generally available" concerning toxic-
ity); Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030, 1036 (7th Cir. 1982)
(describing legislative facts as "those general considerations that move a law-
making or rulemaking body to adopt a rule, as distinct from the facts which
determine whether the rule was correctly applied"), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1156
(1983); see also United Steelworkers v. Textron, Inc., 836 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir.
1987). The court in United Steelworkers upheld a preliminary injunction after
considering "specific, undisputed fact[s]" and
addling] general facts that either are commonly believed or which
courts have specifically held sufficient to show irreparable harm; such
general facts as (1) most retired union members are not rich, (2) most
live on fixed incomes, (3) many will get sick and need medical care,
(4) medical care is expensive, (5) medical insurance is, therefore, a ne-
cessity, and (6) some retired workers may find it difficult to obtain
medical insurance on their own while others can pay for it only out of
money that they need for other necessities of life.
Id It may be argued, however, that the opinion is compatible with taking judi-
cial notice of undisputed adjudicative facts rather than treating the general
facts as premise facts.
Often general-fact decisions are generalizations about human behavior or
human institutions, including economic and social phenomena. General-fact
decisions may concern other aspects of the broad context in which particular
cases arise, however; they may be about laws of nature, for example.
Professor Harold Korn brings another illuminating perspective to our at-
tention in his observations comparing law and the sciences, including social
sciences. He notes that "[l]aw-whether statutory or judge-made--and the sci-
ences both involve bodies of generalized, systematized, and transmissible
knowledge." Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 CoLulx. L. REV.
1080, 1101 (1966). An important difference, however, as Korn notes, is that
law is candidly normative and social science is commonly aimed at being posi-
tive. Id. Korn also observes:
A further, and perhaps the most fundamental, source of difficulty in
technical fact determination is that the law and the scientific knowl-
edge to which it refers often serve different purposes. Concerned
with ordering men's conduct in accordance with certain standards,
values, and societal goals, the legal system is a prescriptive and nor-
mative one dealing with the 'ought to be.' Much scientific knowledge,
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courts treat the evaluative issue of whether the transportation
of explosives on the highways is abnormally dangerous,5 ' there-
fore supporting strict liability, as a premise-fact question. In
contrast, courts treat the evaluation of a driver's allegedly neg-
ligent conduct in driving a truck loaded with explosives at a
speed barely within posted limits as an adjudicative-fact ques-
tion.52 Another type of evaluative determination in tort law oc-
curs in the large body of precedents bearing on whether juries
or courts determine disputes over proximate cause. The legal
decision making includes not only laying down rules and stan-
dards that are precedents but also establishing patterns of deci-
sion making in the evaluative determinations of whether the
issue goes to the jury. These patterns serve as precedents that
enable lawyers and lower courts to understand how a higher
court will address the issue in a particular case.53
In contrast with adjudicative-fact disputes, which usually
involve historical facts and evaluative or interpretive facts,M
premise-fact disputes less often concern historical facts; that is,
disputes of premise fact do not usually focus on happenings,
such as who did what, when, or where. Even when data are in-
troduced,- the emphasis of the dispute is not on the uninter-
preted multitude of historical facts that constitute the data but
on the other hand, is purely descriptive; its 'laws' seek not to control
or judge the phenomena of the real world, but to describe and explain
them in neutral terms.
Id. at 1093-94.
I understand Korn as recognizing that the use of the terms generalized
and systematized to describe premise facts may mislead. We should bear in
mind that it is the purpose for which the fact determination is to be used, not
the inherent nature of the fact itself, that distinguishes between premise facts
and adjudicative facts. It is true that facts material to lawmaking tend to be
generalized and systematized-facts about the state of the world in which we
live, rather than facts about specific events in history. Nevertheless, facts are
in some instances less generalized even when they are material premises for a
reasoned decision of an issue of law and, according to precedent and prevailing
practice, are decided as premise facts.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 484 (1965). The term ul-
trahazardous served the same function in the first Restatement.
52. For discussion of these and other illustrations of evaluative determina-
tions in tort law, see R. KEETON, VENTURING TO Do JUSTICE 64-77 (1969); R.
KEEToN, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 49-60, 88-90, 105-17 (1963); Kee-
ton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 463, 498-506
(1962).
53. See R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 49-60, 88-90, 105-
17 (1963).
54. See O'Neill v. Dell Publishing Co., 630 F.2d 685, 687 (1st Cir. 1980) (in-
volving determination of "substantial similarity" in copyright).
55. C. EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986) (describing starting
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on disputed assertions about whether the data are complete and
what interpretive inferences or evaluative determinations
courts properly may derive from them.
Courts and legislatures also often use data as a basis for
predicting the future. Such use demonstrates that a dispute
over a prediction about the future that may serve as a factual
premise for the decision of an issue of law may involve both
predicted events (predictions about data) and predicted evalua-
tive facts (inferences drawn from the data by extrapolation or
otherwise). Thus, a court may base a legal decision in part on
the decision of a dispute about evaluative inferences but also in
part on the decision of a dispute about predicted future events,
which, after they occur, may be organized and counted as data.
In part, the decision of an issue of law may depend on predic-
tions about the future-what will become, from the perspective
of one even farther in the future, historical facts.5 6
The essence of the distinction between premise facts and
adjudicative facts is the purpose for which they are used in de-
ciding a case. The illustrations considered above demonstrate
that to determine whether a fact is an adjudicative fact or a
premise fact we must probe more deeply than simply determin-
ing which among the four types of facts is involved in a dispute.
We must answer the questions: "Why, under the reasoning of
the court, is the disputed fact material to disposition of the case
before the court, and is it, or was it, material to decision of an
issue of law?"
4. Fourth Principle: An Authorized Decision
Maker's Premises
A decision maker who is authorized to decide an issue of
law is authorized to decide any dispute offact that is a premise
for that decision maker's reasoned decision of the issue of
law. 7
point of stare decisis analysis as determination of "database" available to
court).
56. For fear of confusion, however, perhaps we should resist the tempta-
tion to call them "future historical facts."
57. Expressing it another way, one may say that deciding the truth or fal-
sity of asserted factual premises for a decision of law is a function of the same
person or entity that is authorized to make the decision of law, if that person
or entity concludes that resolving that dispute of fact is essential to the rea-
soned decision of the issue of law. Judge Becker underscores this point in his
opinion in Asbestos Litigation, calling attention to a relevant passage in an
opinion of Justice Holmes:
As Justice Holmes recognized long ago, "the court may ascertain as it
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In each problem case a court is the decision maker. The
court and not the jury decides the disputed premise facts, even
if a jury is to decide disputed adjudicative facts. The trial court
decides disputed facts that are premises for its decision of a
legal issue. On appeal, the appellate court has authority to de-
cide disputed facts that are premises for its decision of a legal
issue rather than deferring to the trial court's decision; that is,
the appellate court may decide by a no-deference standard,
rather than deferring to the trial court decision unless it is
clearly erroneous.58 If the appellate court defers to a trial court
determination of a premise fact, it does so by choice, not by rea-
son of any limitation upon its authority.
In applying this Fourth Principle, one must be precise
about the issue of law being decided. Thus, when a legislature
enacts a statute on a particular subject and an appellate court
subsequently rules on its constitutionality, in a broad sense the
legislature and the appellate court are dealing with the same
subject matter. The precise description of these two different
entities' decision making, however, identifies different issues of
law and different factual premises in their respective decisions.
sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for laying down a rule of
law." Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49, 44 S. Ct. 405,
406, 68 L.Ed. 841 (1924). To forbid such recognition would force courts
to fashion laws without reference to reality.
In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1247 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
Perhaps the phrase as it sees fit is an overstatement of the court's free-
dom. Precedents that were developed during the more than 60 years since
Justice Holmes made this statement in 1924 and during the more than 100
years since he made a similar statement in 1881, see note 100 and accompany-
ing text, infra, have established some constraints. The point is that the person
or entity that decides the issue of law also is authorized to decide any dispute
over an asserted fact that is a premise for its reasoned decision of the issue of
law.
It may help to avoid confusion to underscore the point that it is decisions
of law and not all decisions under law to which this principle applies. Many
decisions under law are decisions of disputes about adjudicative facts that de-
termine whether a particular case is within the scope of an identified legal
rule-whether, for example, the defendant did or did not enter the intersec-
tion when the light was red, thus invoking the statute forbidding such conduct.
58. I am indebted to Professor Maurice Rosenberg for the suggestion that
the appellate court action be described as decision by a no-deference standard
rather than decision de novo (which suggests deciding on an entirely new rec-
ord rather than merely using an expanded record by turning to additional
sources, if the court chooses to do so). Professor Rosenberg would also empha-
size the point that the appellate court is not bound to apply a no-deference
standard. The court may choose to apply a more flexible standard that in-
volves some degree of deference. Cf Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18
(1985) (discussed in note 166, and notes 169-73 and accompanying text, injfra).
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When a legislature considers a proposed anti-balance-bill-
ing statute, as in Case Three, it has before it a whole array of
issues of law that the legislature will decide one way if it enacts
the statute and another way, by default or otherwise, if it does
not. The legislature may, as a premise for its decision making,
decide a factual dispute about whether enactment of the statute
will reduce costs without reducing access of the elderly to medi-
cal care. When physicians challenge the statute in an appellate
court as allegedly in conflict with the Medicare Act and in vio-
lation of the supremacy clause, the issue of law the 'appellate
court considers is not whether it should cast a vote for such a
statute-the set of issues legislators considered-but whether it
should hold the statute unconstitutional.59
Another contrast is illustrative. A dispute about whether a
particular physician billed a particular patient for a balance af-
ter collecting Medicare payments is an adjudicative-fact dispute
if the physician is charged in a disciplinary hearing with violat-
ing the statute. In contrast, a dispute about whether the anti-
balance-billing statute will reduce access to medical care for the
elderly and thus conflict with the Medicare Act in violation of
the supremacy clause is a dispute that is material to the deci-
sion of an issue of law. The appellate court will make a deci-
sion that is precedent applicable to the constitutionality of the
particular state statute before the court and perhaps more
widely by analogy.
The Fourth Principle also permits the appellate court, as
the authorized decision maker for the issue of law, to decide
any disputed question of fact that is a premise for its reasoned
decision of the issue. The appellate court makes such a decision
without any obligation or practice of deference to a trial court
decision, even though it might view the trial court's decision as
not clearly erroneous. The appellate court's role in deciding
this type of fact is thus in sharp contrast with its role in review-
ing findings of adjudicative facts made in trial courts, either by
59. Whatever the court's decision may be, whether it declares the statute
unconstitutional or upholds it, the decision is precedent. It is law. This is true
even when the court has merely applied well-settled precedent, rather than
deciding the issue as one of first impression. In the former circumstance, the
decision of the court is a very minimal act of lawmaking, if lawmaking at all.
In ordinary usage this is more often described as applying settled law than as
making law. It is nevertheless a decision of an issue of law-the constitution-
ality of a specific statute, when challenged on a particular ground or grounds
in a particular case.
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juries or by trial judges.60
The same analysis applies when an issue of constitutional-
ity is before a trial court. When a trial court must rule on con-
stitutionality, it must also decide any factual dispute essential
to its reasoned decision of the issue of constitutionality. The
trial court's decision of the premise fact has exactly the same
force as its decision of the law and is subject to being set aside
on appeal as readily as is its decision on a question of law.
If the trial court misconceived the issue of law and thought
it necessary to decide a specified fact dispute as a premise for
its decision, the trial court properly addressed and decided that
fact dispute,61 even though its decision is overturned because
the appellate court re-frames the legal issue and determines
that it need not decide the fact dispute. The appellate court de-
ciding an issue of law previously considered by the trial court is
not only authorized but obligated to address any premise fact
that serves as part of the basis for its decision of the issue of
law, and in general will be likely to apply a no-deference stan-
dard in making its decision.
Circumstances may arise, however, in which one decision
60. This description of the appellate court's role is consistent with the
First Circuit's decision in Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987). Although the First Circuit
did not adopt my identification of the issue as a nonadjudicative, or premise,
fact question, one may infer that it did not apply the rules of law and practice
that ordinarily apply to adjudicative facts. It is true that the First Circuit
based at least part of its reasoning on evaluation of the evidence offered in the
trial court. The court stated that "[w]e are similarly unconvinced by MMS's
efforts to prove factually in the district court that the Massachusetts balance
billing ban will create an 'obstacle' to providing needy patients with access to
care." Id at 795. Courts are free, however, though not required, to receive
and consider on-the-record testimonial evidence, as well as extra-record evi-
dence, bearing on premise-fact disputes. See infra text accompanying notes 90-
93. Bearing this point in mind, one may read the First Circuit opinion as treat-
ing the dispute as one over premise facts. For example, rather than applying
the "not clearly erroneous" standard of FED. R. CIV. P. Rule 52(a), see supra
note 17, the First Circuit examined the record, the briefs, and, one may infer,
common knowledge of human behavior not recited in the record as a basis for
saying later in the paragraph in which the foregoing passage appears, "[l]ike
the district court, we cannot say that MMS has proved that the ban will hurt
Massachusetts Medicare patients more than it will help them." Massachusetts
Medical Soc'y, 815 F.2d at 795 (concluding that state statute conditioning licen-
sure of person on that person's own agreement not to charge Medicare pa-
tients more than "reasonable charge" established by Department of Health
and Human Services is not preempted by Medicare Act, which permits such
charges).
61. It was authorized to do so in the sense that word is used in the state-
ment of the Fourth Principle.
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maker may properly accept as one of its premises another deci-
sion maker's authorized determination of disputable facts,
rather than making a no-deference determination. This occurs
when a court applies a rational-basis standard for determining
the constitutionality of legislation.6
2
The Fourth Principle, applied to an illustration in which
the decision makers are a state court of last resort, a federal
trial court, and a federal appellate court, demonstrates poten-
tially conflicting federal-state interests. Consider Case One, the
asbestosis case, as viewed by the defendants in federal court af-
ter a state court of last resort adopted a rule denying manufac-
turers of asbestos and asbestos products the state-of-the-art
defense to strict liability claims. Defendants asked federal
courts to hold that this rule of state tort law violated rights
guaranteed to them by the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution.
According to one position asserted in this federal litigation,
the answer to a fact dispute about whether asbestos hazards
were knowable under the state of the art at a given time was a
premise for the legal reasoning of the state supreme court. In
contrast, the disputed premise fact before the federal court
must be formulated differently. For example, plaintiffs con-
tended that the federal court should decide in their favor
63 if
the federal court decides that the evidence bearing on the issue-
of-state-law fact dispute provided a rational basis for the state
supreme court's decision; that is, the federal court should, in
these circumstances, decide for the plaintiffs against the de-
fendants' equal-protection challenge regardless of how the fed-
eral court itself might have decided the issue-of-state-law fact.
There is thus a contrast between a federal appellate court
reviewing the decision of a federal trial court and a federal ap-
pellate court (or a federal trial court) considering a constitu-
tional challenge to a state court's decision of an issue-of-state-
law fact. In the former instance, the federal appellate court
owes no deference to the trial court decision of the issue-of-fed-
eral-law fact dispute. In the latter instance, however, both fed-
eral courts must defer to the state court's decision and review
only to decide whether the evidence available to the state court
satisfied the rational-basis standard.
62. See Twelfth Principle, infra text accompanying notes 122-38.




5. Fifth Principle: Stare Decisis, Claim Preclusion, and Issue
Preclusion
A decision of a dispute over a premise fact has a binding
force analogous to that of precedent under the law of stare deci-
sis and not merely a force analogous to that of a finding of ad-
judicative fact under the law of issue preclusion or claim
preclusion (collateral estoppel or res judicata).6
An adjudicative-fact finding by a jury in one case, for ex-
ample, has no force as precedent and no effect in subsequent
cases except to the extent determined by the law of claim pre-
clusion and issue preclusion.65 In contrast, a premise-fact deci-
sion has force analogous to that of the decision of law for which
it served as a premise fact, and it is doubtful whether it has any
force at all under doctrines of claim preclusion and issue pre-
clusion.66 To the extent that it has force by reason of a court's
using it as a premise fact, it is not subject to challenge except as
part of the challenge to the precedent for which it served as a
premise. A contention that its factual premises are false cannot
evade the precedent. Rather, one may assert the falsity of the
premises in support of the contention that a court should over-
rule the precedent.
The law of res judicata, including limitations on the appli-
cability of claim preclusion and issue preclusion, does not apply
to this effect of premise facts, which is analogous to stare deci-
sis effect.67 A decision of a premise fact does have force gener-
ally in later cases. A court decision of a fact as a premise for
64. In explaining this principle, I will discuss comparisons between prem-
ise facts and adjudicative facts in several different contexts.
65. The generally accepted law of claim preclusion and issue preclusion is
outlined in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 17-29 (1982).
66. I leave unexplored in this Article any arguments that might be made
for holding that a premise-fact determination in one case has, for example, is-
sue-preclusive effect in other legal proceedings between the same parties, so as
to affect a later court determination of either (1) an adjudicative fact or (2) a
premise fact bearing upon a different legal issue from that for which the ear-
lier decision treated that fact as a premise fact. Expressed another way, I do
not consider in this Article whether a premise-fact determination has any ef-
fect (by issue preclusion or otherwise) beyond its effect as an essential part of
the reasoned decision of the issue of law for which it served as a premise fact.
Among the problems to be considered is whether giving issue-preclusive effect
in relation to an adjudicative fact in other litigation between the parties would
be inconsistent with a right to jury trial.
67. Cf. In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1248-51 (3d Cir. 1987)
(Becker, J., concurring) (stating that legislative fact finding need not conform




deciding an issue of law in a particular way is effective not only
in the case at hand, subject to review in higher courts, but also
in future cases in which the precedent for which it served as a
premise is invoked. Such facts aptly may be called precedential
facts.68 Regardless of the terminology used to describe them,
courts give the facts precedential effect.69 A premise-fact deci-
sion that a legislature makes and then uses as a basis for enact-
ing a statute (a legislative fact) is reviewable in courts only, if
at all, under standards developed in constitutional litigation.
0
68. See Massachusetts Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 637 F. Supp. 684, 689 (D.
Mass.), off'd, 815 F.2d 790 (1st Cir. 1986), cet. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
69. See, e.g., United States v. Lynch, 792 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986) (in-
voking as precedent earlier decision that persons 18 to 34 years old "do not suf-
ficiently blend into one 'cognizable group' so as to permit the making of a
prima facie case of juror discrimination simply by showing that the venire un-
derrepresents persons falling within the broad spectrum of those ages");
EEOC v. Trabucco, 791 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1986). The Trabucco court treated a
request for "redetermination of an issue raised, considered, and decided in a
prior case where the presentation of evidence has been 'one-sided,' with no
proffer of rebuttal expert testimony" as raising a stare decisis issue; and con-
cluded that "stare decisis still applies and, on this record, forecloses redetermi-
nation" when plaintiff challenged a Massachusetts statutory mandatory
retirement age of 50 for all members of the uniformed branch of the state po-
lice as not being "a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of [the branch's] business". Id. A recent
opinion of the Seventh Circuit, written by Judge Easterbrook, noted that a
class member who opts out of a class action may not invoke issue preclusion to
bind the defendant in a separate action. Significantly, Judge Easterbrook
added:
To say that issue preclusion does not apply [is not to end the mat-
ter]. Preclusion is not an all-or-nothing matter; there are degrees.
The doctrine of stare decisis supplies some of the lesser degrees. A
decision by the Supreme Court that the Agreement violates the Sher-
man Act would be authoritative .... A decision by the Fourth Circuit
is not authoritative in district courts of the Seventh Circuit, but it is
entitled to respect both for its persuasive power and because it in-
volves the same facts....
...We therefore approach the merits of this case with a strong
presumption in favor of the Fourth Circuit's disposition....
The Fourth Circuit held that the 1% contribution requirement is
price-fixing, a per se violation of the antitrust laws....
.The agreement alleged in this case affected 100% of an eco-
nomically significant market; it was a naked agreement on price ....
There is no escape from the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit that the
agreement is unlawful per se.
Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. National Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 814 F.2d 358,
367-71 (7th Cir. 1987); see also Remarks of the Honorable Robert E. Keeton, 38
S.C.L. REV. 535, 536-37, 538-39 (1987).
70. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109
(1949) (holding that for purposes of due process challenge to state regulation
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As Judge Becker's concurring opinion in Asbestos Litiga-
tion 7l observes, once the the New Jersey Supreme Court made
the determination of knowability of asbestos hazards the basis
for deciding the legal issue of whether a state-of-the-art defense
is available in asbestos cases, the court "was also justified in
precluding the relitigation of the factual basis of the state-of-
the-art defense." 72
Legislative-fact determinations 3 by a legislature as a basis
for enacting a statute and precedential-fact determinations74 by
a court as a basis for deciding an issue of law are a part of the
body of decisions that have a force at least analogous to, if not
the same as, the force of law. Ordinarily it is the legal rule it-
self, rather than the factual determinations, that we speak of as
law. Even so, a court is not free to hold a legal rule inapplica-
ble to the case at hand because the court disagrees with the
premise-fact decisions on which that rule was explicitly or im-
plicitly based. Instead, a court must apply the legal rule unless
the court determines that the rule is to be universally abro-
gated, not just disregarded in the case at hand. A court may ab-
rogate a rule by holding a statute unconstitutional and a court
may overrule its own precedents. If, for example, a court of
last resort determines that the factual premises of a precedent
are incorrect, either because circumstances have changed or be-
cause advances in knowledge have revealed error, the court
may overrule the precedent.75
court will not itself weigh evidence to determine wisdom of regulation but will
defer to judgment of local authorities unless that judgment is shown to be
"palpably false"); see also Twelfth Principle, infra text accompanying notes
122-38.
71. 829 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
72. Id at 1248 (Becker, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) (citing Forte
Towers, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 360 So. 2d 81, 82 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(precluding relitigation of factual predicate), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459 (Fla.
1979)).
A pair of perceptive academic commentators, focusing primarily on deter-
minations developed through social science methodology but apparently in-
tending to apply more broadly to all of the kinds of facts that I refer to as
premise facts, have observed that determinations of these kinds are "used to
create a legal rule," are "more analogous to 'law' than to 'fact,' and hence
should be treated much as courts treat legal precedent." Monahan & Walker,
supra note 22, at 478.
73. Such determinations are decisions of premise-fact disputes.
74. Such determinations are decisions of premise facts.
75. Cf United States v. Lynch, 792 F.2d 269, 271 (1st Cir. 1986) (recogniz-
ing that "conditions in our nation, and in the world, change over time," but
concluding that none of the evidence presented in case before court "under-
cuts our holding in [a previous case] that persons 18 to 34 do not sufficiently
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* B. PREVAILING PRACTICES IN DECIDING PREMISE FACTS
1. Sixth Principle: Inapplicability of Formal Rules Regarding
Judicial Notice
Formal rules regarding judicial notice of adjudicative facts
do not apply to premise facts. In legal systems applying the
Federal Rules of Evidence and state rules or statutes with iden-
tical or closely analogous provisions, a court may take judicial
notice76 of adjudicative facts "not subject to reasonable dis-
pute. 17 7 A court may, but is not required to, follow analogous
procedures as to premise facts that are not subject to reasonable
dispute.
It is sometimes said that in the federal system, judicial no-
tice concerns adjudicative facts only and does not apply to legis-
lative facts or other kinds of premise facts.78 The advisory
committee for the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, uses ju-
dicial notice in a broader sense, despite noting that Rule 201 is
the only formal rule on the subject.7 9 A broader sense also
characterized the usage that was common before the Supreme
Court and Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.80
The advisory committee comments:
This is the only evidence rule on the subject of judicial notice. It
deals only with judicial notice of "adjudicative facts." No rule deals
blend into one 'cognizable group' so as to permit the making of a prima facie
case of juror discrimination simply by showing that the venire under-
represents persons falling within the broad spectrum of those ages").
76. Some confusion arises from the use of judicial notice in quite differ-
ent senses, often without either explicit statement of the meaning intended or
clear indications from the context.
77. FED. R. EvrD. 201(b).
78. The only federal evidence rule on the subject of judicial notice is Rule
201. FED. R. EviD. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a).
79. For the sake of clarity, I do not use judicial notice in a broad sense
that encompasses reasonably disputable facts. Instead, I confine my use of this
phrase to instances in which a fact is not subject to reasonable dispute. Again,
however, I emphasize that I do this as a choice of expression. Many others
have preferred to use judicial notice in a sense broadly applicable to all deter-
minations of lawmaldng facts, and some have continued to prefer the broader
usage even after adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence with their nar-
rower focus upon judicial notice of adjudicative facts. See, e.g., Bulova Watch
Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., t08 F. Supp. 1322, 1327-29 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (Weinstein,
C.J.) (examining use of judicial notice where jurisdiction is sought over mul-
tinational firm).
80. See, e.g., J. THAYER, A PRELMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 308-09 (1898); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2583, at 580, 585 (3d ed.
1940); Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORD. 513, 525-27; Note, Judicial




with judicial notice of "legislative" facts. Judicial notice of matters of
foreign law is treated in Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure and Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.8 1
Nevertheless, whenever Rule 201 or a similar state rule ap-
plies, the formal rule of evidence regarding judicial notice ap-
plies only to adjudicative facts and is inapplicable to premise
facts.8 2 Rule 201 limits judicial notice to facts "not subject to
reasonable dispute."83 Thus, in courts where Federal Rule 201
or a similar state rule applies, if a court uses judicial notice in
relation to premise facts, the term must be understood to have
a more expanded meaning in relation to premise facts than in
relation to adjudicative facts or else the term applies to only a
very small percentage of premise facts. This is true because
premise facts are typically in sharp dispute, as controversies
over legislation illustrate. This applies to lawmaking by courts
as well as to lawmaking by legislatures.8 4
Courts sometimes use judicial notice, however, in a differ-
ent sense than that suggested by the formal rule. Courts some-
times use the term to indicate that the court determines some
facts independently of evidence offered at trial-that is, on the
basis of extra-record factual information. In this broad sense
one may extend the phrase judicial notice to all premise-fact
determinations. Such an extension of the terminology of judi-
cial notice, however, does not justify extending the method of
taking notice of disputed facts without allowing an opportunity
for a contradictory showing in some form.
Whenever courts use judicial notice to decide disputed
premise facts, they are constrained by obligations regarding
method and process even though those obligations are ill-de-
fined. For example, courts have an obligation to give a rea-
soned elaboration of the grounds for a decision. 5 This
obligation is incompatible with taking judicial notice without
explaining why a reasonably disputable fact issue is resolved in
one way rather than another. Courts also have an obligation to
81. FED. R. EvID. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a).
82. See generally 3 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 15 (2d ed.
1980) (discussing role of adjudicative and legislative facts in agency and judi-
cial decision making and role of judicial notice).
83. FED. R. EvlD. 201(b).
84. Cf Judge Becker's concurring opinion in In re Asbestos Litigation, 829
F.2d 1233, 1247 (3d Cir. 1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988) (citing Davis,
A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERSPEC-
TIVES OF LAw 69, 82 (1964)). The Davis article also was quoted in FED. R.
EviD. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a).
85. See Ninth Principle, infra text accompanying note 98.
[Vol. 73:1
PREMISE FACTS
give litigants notice and an opportunity for a hearing before
making a final determination of reasonably disputable premise
facts.8 6
2. Seventh Principle: Inapplicability of Formal
Rules of Evidence
In making adjudicative-fact findings, courts apply formal
rules of evidence and may not base findings on evidence that is
inadmissible under those rules.8 7 In contrast, both trial and ap-
pellate courts, in making premise-fact decisions, are free to
draw upon sources of knowledge not admissible under the for-
mal rules of evidence that apply to adjudicative-fact finding.
There is little explicit authority that explains how the
rules of evidence bear upon premise-fact decisions. An Eighth
Circuit decision, however, supports the proposition that rules of
evidence governing adjudicative-fact finding do not apply to de-
ciding legislative facts.8 The court held that trial court instruc-
tions requiring the jury to accept the judicially noticed facts
were not erroneous because the federal rule declaring that the
court must instruct the jury that it may, but is not required to,
accept any judicially noticed fact does not apply to legislative
facts.8 9
The Seventh Principle also has implicit support in many
other judicial opinions.9° In relation to premise facts, courts
may read books and articles and even listen to lectures.91 An
appellate court is not confined to the record of evidence
presented to the trial court. It may, for example, consider addi-
86. See Tenth Principle, infra text accompanying note 108.
87. Courts may base findings on inadmissible evidence, however, if the
Federal Rules of Evidence provide an exception, as in Rule 104(a). See infra
note 185.
88. United States v. Gould, 536 F.2d 216, 219 (8th Cir. 1976) (referring to
taking "judicial notice" that cocaine hydrochloride is derived from coca leaves
and is a schedule H controlled substance).
89. I& The court referred to Rule 201(g), which states, in full, "[iln a
criminal case, the court shall instruct the jury that it may, but is not required
to, accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed." FED. R. CmM. P. 201(g).
90. Professors Monahan and Walker have marshalled a substantial array
of instances in which reported judicial decisions have implied that courts need
not restrict their determinations of legal issues to a basis in factual premises
developed by methods consistent with the rules of evidence that apply to de-
terminations of adjudicative fact. Monahan & Walker, supra note 22, at 481
nn.14 & 15, 485 n.25.
91. Some judges were invited to and attended this Lockhart Lecture. A
court may not, however, listen to a lecture if it is designed to influence the
decision of the court in a particular case before it.
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tional sources referred to in appellate briefs and may conduct
independent library research. The Supreme Court also has not
confined itself to record evidence. In Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion,92 for example, the Court did not limit itself to considering
the record evidence bearing on the fundamental factual issues
presented in the case.93
Litigants may present testimonial evidence of expert wit-
nesses on disputed premise-fact questions and trial courts may
receive and consider such evidence. The parties need not offer
such evidence, however, and trial courts are not bound to re-
ceive it, or having received it, are not bound to consider it as if
it were presented in relation to an adjudicative-fact dispute.
Only a small percentage of cases involve premise-fact dis-
putes. Most cases that involve factual disputes relate to adjudi-
cative facts. Indeed, only a very small percentage of judicial
opinions even take note of a distinction between adjudicative
and other types of facts. Because of the small number of cases
that involve premise facts and the fundamental differences be-
tween using facts as adjudicative facts and using them as prem-
ise facts, the rules of evidence and procedure fashioned for
resolving adjudicative-fact disputes were not designed for and
are not well suited for resolving premise-fact disputes. If a
court uses a formal rule of evidence, the rule should be closely
examined and its suitability reconsidered before it is used in
resolving premise-fact disputes.
3. Eighth Principle: "Standing" Requirements
Standing requirements94 applicable to adjudicative-fact
disputes do not apply to premise-fact disputes. Any standing
requirements or analogous limitations relating to premise-fact
disputes are far less rigorous than those applying to adjudica-
tive-fact disputes.
The key factual dispute between the parties in Massachu-
setts Medical Society, Case Three, was whether a statute would
have the effect of restricting the elderly's access to medical
92. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
93. See id at 494 n.11 (citing articles discussing psychological and other ef-
fects of racial discrimination); see also Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Miss., 718
F.2d 738, 748 n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing other cases in which "[t]he writings and
studies of social science experts on legislative facts are ... considered and cited
by the Supreme Court with or without introduction into the record"); FED. R.
EvID. 201 advisory committee's note.




care. In considering the central issue of that case, the court as-
sumed that such a restriction would conflict with an important
purpose of the Medicare Act: insuring the availability of medi-
cal care to the elderly.
A standing issue arose because it was the physicians who
attempted to prove the detrimental effects of the statute on the
health care of the elderly. Although the interests of physicians
and elderly patients are in some respects compatible and rein-
forcing, in other respects there are serious conflicts of interest
between physicians (who bill) and the class of elderly patients
for whose benefit Medicare was enacted (and who must pay
those bills). Moreover, two organizations whose stated purpose
is the promotion of the interests of the elderly chose to inter-
vene on the side of the defendants. Neither the trial court nor
the court of appeals, however, invoked standing requirements
to preclude any argument or proffer of evidence by either the
plaintiffs or the intervenors.95
A court may, and should, fashion less restrictive standing
requirements or analogous limitations for premise-fact disputes
than those applying to adjudicative-fact disputes. It may do so
because the concern about limiting judicial decisions to cases or
controversies that underlies standing requirements for adjudi-
cative-fact decisions is much less likely to apply to premise-fact
decisions. For example, when a court takes evidence offered by
adversarial parties in relation to an adjudicative-fact dispute
and makes findings based on the weight of that evidence, the
requirements of standing plainly serve an important purpose.
The underlying objective of standing requirements-assuring
that a genuine case or controversy is before the court with the
adverse interests adequately represented-is implicated. Thus,
when a court considers evidence presented by opposing sides in
accordance with the rules of evidence for the purpose of mak-
ing a finding about an adjudicative fact, the Constitution and
case law traditionally have set well-defined limits on who may
present what proof and argument.96 When, on the other hand,
the court is considering premise facts-for example, the infor-
95. This is not to say, however, that the court recognized a right of the
intervenors to proffer evidence or participate in oral argument. Those issues
were deferred in the trial court and were never addressed, because the inter-
venors did not proffer evidence or oral argument as the case developed.
96. See, e.g., Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112 (1976) (requiring plain-
tiffs to allege "injury in fact" and to be "proper proponents" of the rights for
which they bring suit); Friedman v. Harold, 638 F.2d 262, 265-87 (1st Cir. 1981)
(applying Singleton two-part standing test).
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mation on which it is to determine the constitutionality of a
statute-it is less important that the court sharply define who
may present what information and argument. Indeed, the court
itself may go to reference books for enlightenment with respect
to this kind of information.
There are compelling reasons that courts not only may, but
should, fashion less-restrictive standing requirements for prem-
ise facts than for adjudicative facts. Because a decision of
premise fact is a precedent, it has a more general effect, ex-
tending beyond the interests of the parties to the case before
the court and other parties affected by claim preclusion or issue
preclusion. It is both fair and appropriate that courts allow for-
mal participation by interested persons who may aid in the
premise-fact decision making without unduly interfering with
the roles of advocates for the parties to the case before the
court.
This is not to say, however, that courts should not invoke
any standing requirements or analogous limitations. The amici
who come forward are likely to be partisans of special inter-
ests.9 7 They may aid a court substantially, especially in reduc-
ing risks that a court may be uninformed about implications of
its decision, but a court should evaluate their submissions with
awareness of interest and potential bias.
4. Ninth Principle: Reasoned Decisions and Explanations
A court deciding an issue of law has the dual obligation of
reasoned decision making and candor about reasons; that is, a
decision should be reasoned, and reasons should be disclosed.
This dual obligation applies to decisions of premise facts and
imposes constraints on methods of deciding disputes about
premise facts.
The principle of reasoned elaboration of decisional grounds
is one of general application in our legal system.98 A number of
distinguished judges and commentators, however, have de-
scribed the freedom of courts to determine premise facts in
97. Judge Aldrich's comment in Strasser v. Doorley, 432 F.2d 567, 569 &
n.2 (1st Cir. 1970), illustrates this point. Observing that "an amicus who ar-
gues facts should rarely be welcomed," he quoted from one adversary of an
amicus position who warned: "That fellow isn't any more a friend of the court
than I am." Id.
98. See H. Hart & A. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the
Making and Application of Law 588-89 (tent. ed. 1958) (unpublished manu-
script). I acknowledge that I am not able to marshal substantial explicit au-
thority for applying this principle in the present context.
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terms so broad as to appear incompatible with the Ninth Princi-
ple. For example, Justice Holmes stated that "the court may
ascertain as it sees fit any fact that is merely a ground for lay-
ing down a rule of law."99 Justice Holmes had earlier advo-
cated that judges use their conscience as a constraint, however,
by arguing that when disputed facts are grounds for "decisions
upon the law-grounds for legislation, so to speak-the judges
may ascertain them in any way which satisfies their con-
science."' 00 Even if interpreted as meaning that judges are not
answerable to any other institution, this passage implies that
they should be constrained by what we might call judicial con-
science rather than purely personal conscience.
Moreover, although this Ninth Principle imposes more rig-
orous constraints than a court's conscience, the principle is not
novel. For example, the premise was implicitly and perhaps ex-
plicitly a basis for the defendant's argument in Case One, As-
bestos Litigation, that "the New Jersey court's reasoning is
unarticulated and irrational .... " 1 01 Judge Weis rejected the
contention "in light of the steady evolution over the last twenty
years of the doctrine of strict products liability in [New
Jersey's] law."'01 2 Significantly, Judge Weis chose to challenge
the factual assertion that the New Jersey court had not articu-
lated its reasoning rather than the implicit premise that courts
generally have an obligation to articulate their reasons.
The principle of requiring elaboration of the grounds of de-
cision is implicit in what many courts have said and done in ad-
dressing premise-fact disputes. This point is underscored by
commentators who have undertaken a thoughtful evaluation of
judicial performance in particular areas of the law.10 3
99. Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1924). See also other
broad descriptions of a court's freedom, discussed supra text accompanying
notes 38-39, and infra text accompanying note 144. Nevertheless, it seems
doubtful that this passage in Justice Holmes's opinion should be interpreted as
supporting a wholly unrestrained freedom.
100. O.W. HOLMEs, JR., Lecture IV, Fraud, Malice, and Intent-The The-
ory of Torts, in THE COMMON LAw 151 (1881).
101. In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987), cert de-
nied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988) (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. Professor Kenneth Davis would very likely be more critical than I
have been of what courts have thus far said and done in this respect. See, e.g.,
Davis, Facts, supra note 22, at 931. But in any event his many treatments of
legislative-fact issues call attention to instances of judicial performance consis-
tent with the views he advances. Those views, as I understand them, strongly
support the principle of a judicial obligation of reasoned elaboration of
grounds of decision of all legislative facts in the very broad sense he uses that
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Judge Frank Coffin1°4 calls attention to the critical signifi-
cance of a court's choice of "[t]he level of generality on which a
case is to be decided" 105 and the bearing this choice has on the
sufficiency of the court's inquiry into legislative facts.1 06 Judge
Coffin notes:
If the case is one that should be decided on a very broad basis, I would
not propose that the Court set itself up as a legislative factfinder or
that it be equipped, as Kenneth Culp Davis has suggested, with its
own enclave of fact researchers. I do wonder, however, if, in a balanc-
ing case where the decision is likely to be broad, the trial court from
the beginning should not expect some expert evidence on the wider
scene, and counsel on appeal should not be expected to submit some-
thing approaching the contemporary version of a Brandeis brief. In
any event, a self-conscious effort should be made to gather a factual
framework as commensurate as feasible with the scope of the issue
decided.10
7
Finally, the obligation of reasoned elaboration of the
grounds of a premise-fact decision is implicit in even more fun-
damental ideas about the roles of judging in a system of govern-
ment under law. A judge is obliged to apply not his or her own
norms but the community's norms, as developed in authorita-
tive sources that include, along with constitutions, statutes, and
precedents, premise-fact determinations that have the force of
precedent, as stated in the Fifth Principle.
5. Tenth Principle: Reasoned Choice of Method for
Determining Premise Facts
When there is no precedent regarding the method for de-
ciding premise facts, the court has the dual obligation of rea-
soned decision making about method and disclosure of
reaso nS.
1 0 8
term (nearly, if not identical with, the scope of the term premise facts as I
have used it). See also the thoughtful treatment of judicial notice of legislative
as well as adjudicative facts in Note, supra note 80, at 740-58.
104. Coffin, Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice, 63 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 16 (1988) (James Madison Lecture delivered at New York University
School of Law in 1987).
105. Id. at 33.
106. Id. at 33-37.
107. Id. at 37 (footnotes omitted).
Another thoughtful commentator, formerly Judge and now Professor
Peggy Davis, advances what she refers to as processes of "absorption" and
"evaluation" of extra-record evidence used in deciding legislative facts. Davis,
Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, supra note 22, at 1593-1604. Her pro-
posals are surely compatible with an obligation of reasoned elaboration of the
grounds of decision of all premise facts.
108. I acknowledge that I am not able to cite explicit authority for the
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Deciding what a court's methods shall be in deciding prem-
ise facts is deciding a procedural issue of law.109 Courts should
develop a body of reasoned decisions concerning the legitimacy
of using extra-record fact submissions, whether in the form of
amicus submissions, invited or volunteered, in the form of
Brandeis briefs11 ° submitted by the litigants, or in some other
form.
An objection to Brandeis briefs is that "the data presented
ought to be placed in the record and not left simply for the
brief. If the data are presented for the record, there will be an
opportunity for impeaching them and offering countervailing
data." ' In reported judicial opinions 12 and other writings 13
of the last quarter century, one can find a number of examples
of techniques devised for placing factual submissions "on the
record" in a practical sense, even when the submissions are not
formally received in evidence, as if the court were determining
an adjudicative-fact dispute.114
General recognition of an obligation of reasoned decision
making about methods of deciding disputed premise facts
Tenth Principle. For the present, until further developments occur-and I be-
lieve they will soon-I rest my submission on the challenge to you to consider
whether you do not agree that this Tenth Principle is an appropriate extrapo-
lation from the Ninth Principle, if not merely a corollary of the Ninth.
109. The obligations of reasoned decision making and candid explanation
should apply to procedural issues of law as well as substantive issues of law.
110. More than a quarter of a century ago, Professor Paul Freund, com-
menting on the role of counsel in providing "data upon which the court may
draw in deciding a case," remarked:
Probably the most notable contribution to the lawyer's technique in
constitutional cases was the so-called Brandeis brief submitted in the
Oregon hours of labor for women case.... This type of brief has been
in fairly common use ever since.... It is one of the few inventions in
legal technique that can be identified in a profession that is not nota-
ble for wandering off the beaten path. The invention has been widely
and justly acclaimed. Yet it raises a number of very real problems,
which I shall simply suggest.
P. FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (Meridian ed.
1961) (footnote omitted).
111. Id- at 151.
112. The temptation to initiate research into the body of unreported exam-
ples is limited because examples not formally reported would be likely to be
also examples not explicitly reasoned.
113. See, e.g., Rosenberg, Improving the Courts'Ability to Absorb Scientific
Information, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVICE TO THE PRESIDENT, CON-
GRESS AND JUDICIARY (W. Golden ed. 1988).
114. See discussion following the Ninth Principle, supra text accompanying
notes 98-107 and infra text accompanying notes 143-46.
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would contribute greatly both to improved decision making and
to making decisions more accessible as precedents.
6. Eleventh Principle: Constraints on Method
Principles of fair process impose some constraints upon
methods of judicial determination of premise facts. Beyond
complying with those limited constraints, courts do, at least in
some circumstances, fashion special procedures, which in their
nature are self-imposed constraints, to provide opportunities
for submissions by the parties bearing on factual hypotheses
that are potentially decisive of an issue of law. Courts are espe-
cially likely to do so when the factual assertions are subject to
reasonable dispute.
Professor Kenneth Davis urged that the drafters of Rule
201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence fill the gaps in existing
law with a wide-ranging rule on judicial notice in the broadest
sense, extending to legislative as well as adjudicative facts and
to disputable as well as indisputable facts.' 15 The drafters did
not adopt his proposal. Indeed, the advisory committee's note
states that "[n]o rule deals with judicial notice of 'legislative'
facts."'1 16 One should not read this statement, however, as re-
jecting the extension of the terminology of judicial notice to
legislative as well as adjudicative facts, nor as declaring that no
constraints apply to methods of judicial determination of legis-
lative facts. The advisors were merely saying that no rule
stated in the Federal Rules of Evidence applies to legislative-
fact determinations. Although Professor Davis's proposal was
not received favorably, the gaps in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence and other sources of law to which one might turn for gui-
dance do not constitute a void.
Many courts have adopted particular ways of providing op-
portunities for the parties to file written submissions, present
oral arguments, and, sometimes, to present evidence without
invoking all the constraints incident to the trial of disputed ad-
judicative facts.117 The principal difficulty one encounters at
present in finding and comparing all these instances of choice
of method is, more often than not, that the court has taken ac-
tion without making a conscious, reasoned choice-without re-
115. Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 513, 530-32.
116. FED. R. EviD. 201 advisory committee's note, subdivision (a).




lating the specific choice to some guiding principle or rule.- 8
Indeed, the choice of method for fact determination often has
occurred, without even explicit acknowledgment that some-
thing other than adjudicative-fact finding was occurring.119
There is no reason for declining to use the common-law
method of reasoned explanation of decisions and growth of law
through precedents, not only in developing substantive law but
also in developing rules of procedural law-and, in particular,
rules regarding how courts go about deciding disputed premise
facts. An extraordinarily general standard of constraint such as
fair process or, in Professor Davis's formulation, "maximum of
convenience that is consistent with procedural fairness,"'2 0
leaves greater discretion to individual decision makers than is
needed and, correspondingly, less guidance than is desirable.
In a substantial number of opinions, courts have explicitly
considered methods for permitting interested persons to partici-
pate in the process of informing the court or for presenting oral
or written submissions responding to a court's tentative deter-
mination.12 1 Thus, courts have developed ways of placing data,
expert opinions, and other materials they use in deciding prem-
ise facts on the record. One may continue to view materials re-
118. Cf. id. at 1600-01 (calling for clarity about need for judicial lawmaking
and for rigorous attention to limitations that should surround it).
119. See, for example, an array of instances recited in Davis, Facts, supra
note 22. This is the most underdeveloped area of the law of deciding premise-
fact disputes. Cf Davis, Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, supra note
108, at 1593-1604 (describing processes. of absorption and evaluation of legisla-
tive facts). Professor Peggy Davis observes that courts should be sensitive to
the interests and capabilities of the parties to develop evidence bearing upon
disputed legislative facts, including resource disparities and their effect on the
evidence-gathering process. Id at 1599.
120. Davis, supra note 115, at 531.
121. See, e.g., Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322, 1328-
29 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). In Bulova Watch, Chief Judge Weinstein stated:
In view of the extensive judicial notice taken, based partly upon
the court's own research, the court issued a preliminary memoran-
dum and invited the parties to be heard on the "propriety of taking
judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed" upon motion made
within ten days. This procedure complies with the spirit of Rule
201(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence reading as follows:
(e) Opportunity to Be Heard. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety
of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In
the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after
judicial notice has been taken.
Inviting parties to participate in such ongoing colloquy has the advan-
tage of reducing the possibility of egregious errors by the court and
increases the probability that the parties may believe they were fairly
treated, even if some of them are dissatisfied with the result.
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ceived and considered in this way as extra-record evidence,
because the use of these materials is not limited by rules of ad-
missibility applied to adjudicative-fact findings. Nevertheless,
placing such materials on the record contributes, in a broader
sense, both to regularity in process and wisdom in decision
making.
Id-
In O'Hanlon v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 457 F. Supp. 961 (D. Del.
1978), Judge Stapleton wrote:
The sole question now before the Court is whether Section 3902
of Title 18 of the Delaware Code, pertaining to uninsured motorist in-
surance, applies to an excess liability insurance policy which, up to a
limit of $1,000,000, insures the policy holder, inter alia, for bodily in-
jury, death and property damage liability to a third party in excess of
the $100,000/$300,000 retained limits of primary coverage. This issue
was raised earlier on cross-motions for summary judgment. Although
there was no dispute at that time regarding any relevant adjudicative
facts, I nevertheless concluded that disposition of this issue should
await a fuller development of the record. An evidentiary hearing was
subsequently held at which the parties were afforded the opportunity
to present any evidence which might shed light on the "legislative
facts" surrounding the enactment of Section 3902.
Legislative facts are "those which have relevance to legal reason-
ing and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a legal
principle or ruling by a judge ... or in the enactment of a legislative
body." Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
The Federal Rules of Evidence prescribe no procedure by which
courts are to go about receiving information regarding legislative
facts, but the approach discussed there "leave[s] open the possibility
of introducing evidence through regular channels in appropriate situa-
tions." Advisory Committee Notes to Federal Rule of Evidence 201.
Courts regularly and inevitably engage in findings of legislative
facts. While these facts are not normally developed through the pres-
entation of evidence, there are instances when access to the pertinent
data is most appropriately received through live testimony presented
by the parties. This is one of those cases.
When a court is attempting to ascertain information relating to
the marketing practices of an industry at a point in time, and to draw
inferences from those practices regarding the intent of the legislature
in fashioning legislation, the relevant data is most readily available
through witnesses familiar with those practices. Those witnesses not
only can provide information through direct examination, but are also
available for cross-examination and to answer any inquiries which the
Court might have. For these reasons, I agree that "[o]nce the court
decides to advise itself in order to make new law, it ought not add to
the risk of a poor decision by denying itself whatever help on the facts
it can with propriety obtain." 1 Weinstein and Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence (1977 ed.), [para.] 2000[03], p. 200-16.
The hearing held in this case fulfilled its purpose. As the remain-
der of this Opinion will demonstrate, the evidence of legislative facts
submitted at that time was of substantial assistance in understanding
and resolving the issue before the Court.
O'Hanlon, 457 F. Supp. at 962-63 (footnotes omitted).
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7. Twelfth Principle: Reconsideration and Review of-
Premise-Fact Determinations
Standards for reconsideration and review of premise-fact
determinations vary significantly from the standards applying
to reconsideration and review of adjudicative-fact findings.
a. Effect in Higher Courts of Trial Court Determinations of
Fact
(1) Characteristics of Determinations of Fact in Jury Trials
In a jury trial, adjudicative-fact findings by the jury on is-
sues as to which, under the evidence, reasonable persons could
differ are binding on the parties and cannot be set aside, either
by the trial court or on appeal, merely because a court would
find differently on the evidence.
22
In contrast, premise-fact disputes are not submitted to a
jury. The judge decides such disputes in both jury and nonjury
trials.12 3 On appeal, reconsideration of premise facts is like ap-
pellate reconsideration of the trial court's legal rulings. It is
very different from review of adjudicative-fact findings.
(2) Characteristics of Determinations of Fact
in Nonjury Proceedings
A trial judge's adjudicative-fact findings in a federal non-
jury trial are reviewable under the standard prescribed in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are set aside on appeal
only if "clearly erroneous.''2 4 This proposition is amply sup-
ported by precedent.125
In contrast, with respect to premise-fact decisions, higher
courts owe no deference to a trial court and may make their
own determinations of such facts. This conclusion is implicit in
the United States Supreme Court's decision concerning the ef-
fects of "death qualification" of jurors during voir dire on the
impartiality of the trial jury in the guilt phase of a capital mur-
der trial.126 Although the criminal trial itself was a jury trial,
122. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 95, at
473 (3d ed. 1976).
123. This conclusion is implicit in decisions such as those of the New
Jersey Supreme Court in the asbestos cases. See the analysis of the New
Jersey decisions in In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1235-45 (3d Cir.
1987), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
125. See, e.g., Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709, 714 (1986).
126. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178-79 (1986).
19881
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the issue regarding death qualification of jurors was not subject
to jury trial. The court determined the issue in nonjury pro-
ceedings. The defendant argued that the factual findings of the
district court and the Eighth Circuit on the effects of death
qualification were reviewable by the Supreme Court only under
the clearly erroneous standard set forth in the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.27 The Supreme Court answered:
Because we do not ultimately base our decision today on the invalidity
of the lower courts' "factual" findings, we need not decide the "stan-
dard of review" issue. We are far from persuaded, however, that the
"clearly erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of "leg-
islative" facts at issue here. The difficulty with applying such a stan-
dard to "legislative" facts is evidenced here by the fact that at least
one other Court of Appeals, reviewing the same social science studies
as introduced by McCree, has reached a conclusion contrary to that of
the Eighth Circuit. 12 8
A recent Seventh Circuit decision also indicates that higher
courts owe no deference to a trial court's decisions on premise
facts.-29 The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court's factual
determination that insecurely fastened yarmulkes do not pose a
substantial hazard to basketball players.' 30
The Fifth Circuit has also discussed a number of the rea-
sons underlying the conclusion that premise-fact decisions
should not be subject to the clearly-erroneous standard. In
Dunagin v. City of Oxford, Mississippi,'3 ' the court stated that
a question about which premise facts are relevant "is not a
question specifically related to this one case or controversy; it is
a question of social factors and happenings which may submit
127. The defendant referred to FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
128. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 168 n.3 (citations omitted).
129. Menora v. Illinois High School Ass'n, 683 F.2d 1030 (7th Cir. 1982).
130. Id at 1036.
We are accused of having failed to apply the clearly-erroneous
rule to the district court's finding that insecurely fastened yarmulkes
do not pose a substantial hazard to basketball players. That rule,
however, is designed for the review of findings of "historical," not
"legislative," fact. Legislative facts are those general considerations
that move a lawmaking or rulemaking body to adopt a rule, as distinct
from the facts which determine whether the rule was correctly ap-
plied. There is no question that insecurely fastened yarmulkes are
within the scope of the Illinois High School Association's no-headwear
rule; the question is whether the Association's concern with safety is
substantial enough to support the rule as so interpreted; and a fact
that goes to the reasonableness of a rule or other enactment is a clas-
sic example of a legislative fact, to which as we have said the clearly-
erroneous standard does not apply.
I1.
131. 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc).
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to some partial empirical solution but is likely to remain sub-
ject to opinion and reasoning. ' 132 Thus, higher courts do not
give decisions on "social factors and happenings" the same def-
erence that they give to findings on discrete occurrences be-
tween particular parties that are material only to issues of fact
between those parties.133
Substantial support therefore exists in both precedent and
principle for the proposition that higher courts are free to con-
sider disputes over premise facts on a no-deference basis. They
are not obliged to accept all but clearly erroneous decisions of
premise facts by the trial court.
b. Effect of a Legislature's Explicit or Implicit Fact
Determinations and the Standards of Scrutiny
Neither a trial court nor an appellate court may set aside
or disregard legislative determinations of fact that were the ba-
sis for a statute's enactment, except to the extent that the court
determines that, as a matter of constitutional law, the legisla-
ture's reliance on those asserted facts cannot withstand
scrutiny.13 4
Consider a municipality's enactment of a horse-and-buggy
ordinance, prohibiting a person from sounding an automobile
horn within fifty feet of a horse and buggy. The implicit, if not
explicit, factual premises are: people will come into town by
horse and buggy (a prediction about future events) and safety
interests outweigh the automobile owners' interest in attracting
attention by the use of a horn (a predictive-evaluative-fact
determination). Fifty years later, any reasonably prudent ob-
server would say the facts have changed. Who should deter-
mine whether the predictive-evaluative-fact determination on
which the legislature originally based the ordinance shall be
changed? Should only the legislature be permitted to make a
change, or may a court properly make the change under the ru-
132. Id. at 748 n.8 (plurality op.).
133. The Dunagin plurality opinion also implicitly noted the special role of
the appellate courts in resolving issues of constitutional law. That role would
be significantly eroded if the higher courts' determinations were made to
"hinge on the views of social scientists who testify as experts at trial." .1&; see
also Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18 (1985) (adhering to precedent estab-
lishing that "voluntariness" of confession is matter for independent federal
determination).
134. See Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949); see also
Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 748 n.8 ("If the legislative decision is not binding at this
stage, at least it carries great weight. Certainly it cannot be thrust aside by
two experts and a judicial trier of fact.").
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bric of desuetude 35 or on some other theory?136
Determining whether a statute or rule will pass constitu-
tional muster in court does not depend on whether the factual
premises 37 are correct. The determination may depend, how-
ever, on whether the person or legal entity that made the
premise-fact decisions was authorized to do so, and then on
whether enough evidence was (or is) available to make the
premise-fact decisions supportable under the applicable stan-
dard of scrutiny. 3
Moreover, once a statute or rule has survived scrutiny and
review under a constitutional attack or a court decision has es-
tablished some precedent, the durability of that statute, rule, or
precedent-its ability to withstand demands for abrogation, lim-
itation, or modification--depends in part on the continuing va-
lidity, or continued accuracy, of the factual premises on which
the lawmaking decision was based.
V. THE LAW OF PREMISE FACTS: ITS PRACTICAL USE
TO LAWYERS AND JUDGES
Settled law about how disputes over premise facts are re-
solved has revealed more about what is not required 3 9 than
about what is either required or is at least appropriate and use-
ful. Rules of evidence do not apply. Constraints on appellate
rejection of trial-court fact decisions do not apply. Appellate
and trial courts are not restricted to the record of evidence
presented by the parties. Nevertheless, judicial decisions and
other sources of authority do provide more affirmative gui-
135. Desuetude is a doctrine of questionable applicability in American law.
See United States v. Elliott, 266 F. Supp. 318, 325-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (compar-
ing civil and common-law traditions and holding that nonuse alone does not
abrogate statute).
136. Compare G. CALABREsI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
81-181 (1982), with F. COFFIN, THE WAYS OF A JUDGE 193-249 (1980) and Cof-
fin, Book Review, 91 YALE L.J. 827, 841 (1982) (reviewing G. CALABRESI, A
COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES).
137. The underlying factual premises of a statute are sometimes formally
stated and sometimes tacitly assumed.
138. The varied standards of scrutiny or review have commanded the at-
tention of many courts and commentators. The relationship between these
standards and principles regarding premise-fact determinations is a subject of
very substantial scope, which is not developed in this Article.
139. The Seventh and Eighth Principles, for example, emphasize well-es-
tablished, negative procedural consequences of identifying a dispute of fact as
a dispute over a premise fact; specifically, the rules of evidence and standing
fashioned for adjudicative-fact disputes do not apply. Such rules may be used
to suggest ways of proceeding, but they are not firm constraints.
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dance. For this body of authority to be useful, it must be acces-
sible when needed, and bench and bar must recognize the need.
Because we have no "Code of Premise Facts," no state or
federal rules of premise facts, nor any good set of keynumbers
or other research devices that guide us quickly to all the rele-
vant judicial opinions, access to authorities is limited. Discus-
sions of relevant precedents are available, however, in treatises
on administrative law and evidence and in a growing body of
law review articles. The major problem is that there is no gen-
eral recognition that this body of law exists and that it can be
useful to judges and advocates.
Professor Kenneth Davis has proposed the creation of a na-
tional fact-finding agency to which the United States Supreme
Court would refer legislative-fact disputes for study and recom-
mendation. 40 Proposals have been advanced from time to time
for a "National Science Court" or a similar body to decide dis-
putes of fact about issues identified as scientific in nature.
Committees of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, or the American Law Institute might consider whether
some entity should develop or adopt formal rules of procedure,
a model statute, or a study and recommendation.141
I do not advocate proposals for a new agency or a special-
ized science court outside the judicial system. Moreover, I be-
lieve it would be far more difficult to draft a good statute on
this subject than to develop more useful guidance through the
common-law process. A set of procedural and evidentiary rules
for deciding premise-fact disputes, analogous to the rules of
procedure and rules of evidence for adjudicative-fact finding, is
perhaps a more feasible target. There is no urgent need, how-
ever, for such formal rules. Moreover, even if formal rules
eventually are warranted, drafting them should be deferred un-
til there is more explicit case-by-case consideration of premise-
fact disputes. Methods and practices useful in resolving dis-
puted premise facts already are known. If these methods are
not candidly and explicitly used as much as they should be, the
140. Davis, Proposed Research Service, supra note 22, at 17.
141. One might even envision an undertaking by the American Law Insti-
tute that would be consistent both with a preference for the common-law pro-
cess of law development in this area and the Restatement tradition.of the
Institute-for example, a "Restatement of the Law of Lawmaking," covering a




explanation for their disuse is likely unease about candor' 42 or
a lack of recognition of just how useful candid consideration of
these processes might be.
The following are positive suggestions about steps courts
may take to improve the quality of premise-fact decisions.
First, courts may make tentative decisions and place them
before the advocates with an invitation for submissions, such as
affidavits and briefs, showing reasons for modification before
the court enters them as decisions. This practice is already in
moderate use in trial courts. It is a practice occasionally used in
appellate courts-for example, by an order for reargument on
specified issues. The burdens of cost and delay from using this
procedure may be somewhat greater in appellate than in trial
courts, but the benefits of engaging the advocates in the process
before decisions are premised on factual determinations not ex-
plicitly addressed in briefs and arguments may outweigh bur-
dens at both levels.
Second, a court may invite amicus submissions when it is
about to set precedent based on a premise-fact decision that will
significantly affect identifiable interests beyond and different
from those of the parties before the court.143
Third, the court may fashion procedures for receiving evi-
dence to serve effectively the aim of timely, accurate (as to his-
torical facts), and wise (as to evaluative facts) decisions of
premise-fact disputes. Premise facts in their nature are typi-
cally so different from adjudicative-fact disputes that proce-
dures for resolving adjudicative-fact disputes are cumbersome
and likely to impair the quality of decision making. For exam-
ple, a written submission may more effectively present the rele-
vant evidence than can oral direct and cross-examination. Even
when a court determines that it is useful to have expert opinion
in testimonial form, the parties may file depositions, and even
when an expert witness testifies at trial, the court may con-
clude that the evidence will be more understandable if the ex-
pert first presents evidence in an organized lecture before any
oral examination by advocates or the court.'"
142. Cf. G. CALABRESI, supra note 136, at 178-81 (arguing for candor in all
judicial opinions and especially Supreme Court opinions); Shapiro, In Defense
of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 733-50 (1987) (discussing whether
judge's role may justify departing from candor).
143. As to the need for caution, however, see supra text following note 96.
144. In considering more flexible procedures for effective use of experts in
developing information bearing on disputed premise facts, we may profit from
examining procedures commonly used in other legal systems. See, e.g.,
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Experiences with alternative dispute resolution demon-
strate the desirability of greater procedural flexibility. In sev-
eral three to five-hour summary jury trials of short cases' 45 and
in several two-day nonjury conditional trials of long cases,146
procedural orders divided the time equally between the parties
and created an incentive structure for using the allocated time
most effectively. In all instances, counsel chose to present only
limited parts of the evidence in oral question and answers and
far more of it, interspersed with argument, by reading from
statements or depositions or simply calling to the attention of
the court or jury relevant parts of the documents placed before
them as exhibits.
Thus, question-and-answer form is seldom the most effi-
cient and effective method of presenting a witness's direct testi-
mony. Cross-examination may be essential, however, to testing
critical aspects of the testimony. At least for premise-fact dis-
putes, if not more generally, a flexible procedure allowing both
an efficient and organized presentation of a witness's position
and a testing of key elements of that position through questions
by opposing counsel and the court is superior to the traditional
direct and cross-examination of expert witnesses traditionally
used for adjudicative-fact issues.
These suggestions about procedure are illustrative only,
and I have left many questions unanswered.147 The underlying
principle I urge is flexibility and adaptability of procedures to
Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 823,
835-41 (1985) (discussing choice and use of experts in Germany).
145. By short cases I mean those that would have taken no more than a
week to try.
146. By long cases I mean those that would have required two to six
months for an ordinary jury trial.
147. Among these is the meaning of Lewis Carroll's playfully suggestive
line, "And whether pigs have wings." See supra note 1. From the opening
lines of the verse, "[tihe time has come ... [t]o talk of many things," one
might infer that, for some undisclosed reason, "shoes--and ships--and sealing
wax-. . . cabbages-and kings.. ." have something in common. Charles Dar-
win theorized that the forelegs of some species of animal have something in
common with the wings of birds and bats. His The Origin of Species was pub-
lished in 1859. The immediate storm of controversy reached a notable peak at
the British Association at Oxford in 1860, in a celebrated duel between T.H.
Huxley, a champion of Darwinian hypotheses, and Bishop Wilberforce of Ox-
ford. Who was, at that moment in history, a brilliant young mathematical lec-
turer at Oxford, a resident of the same college as Bishop Wilberforce? I hope
you will not be disappointed that the answer is Charles Lutwidge Dodgson,
son of an English vicar of Daresbury, Cheshire.
In 1865, just five years after the Huxley-Wilberforce duel, the first literary
work of a previously unknown person was published. Nobody could remem-
1988]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the nature of particular premise-fact disputes. Yet, in one re-
spect a competing principle of reasonable constraint merits at-
ber ever having met the man, much less having known him to be a writer.
That book was Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland.
The brilliant mathematician Dodgson, whose published works during the
next three decades included highly acclaimed algebraic proofs of opaque Eu-
clidian theories, was often asked through the years about a rumored connec-
tion between himself and the author who delighted children of all ages with
works published under the pseudonym, or as we say in courts, the a/k/a ("also
known as") Lewis Carroll. Dodgson's consistent response, expressed in for-
mal, third-person style, was: "Mr. Dodgson [has] neither claimed nor acknowl-
edged any connection with the books not published under his name." 7
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA 66, 493-94 (1956 ed.).
The mathematical genius surely knew he was not causing anybody to be-
lieve that he was not a/k/a Lewis Carroll, but he continued to enjoy the for-
mal pretense. Given his playful mind, could it be that in that phrase "whether
pigs have wings" Dodgson was alluding to a controversy spawned by Darwin's
The Origin of Species-a controversy still alive in the late 20th century in a
version that recently has been called a clash between "Creation Science" and
"Evolution Science"? If so, Lewis Carroll may have been as surely a commen-
tator on the legal system as Charles Dickens, though a subtler, and perhaps
more prescient, one. Did Lewis Carroll foresee what was perhaps the most in-
teresting case on the docket of the Supreme Court of the United States in its
last term-Edwards v. Aguillard, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987)?
Even a slim chance that this is so compels me to state another problem
case, derived from Edwards, and to add to the three questions about asbestosis,
boxing titles, and balance bills, one more, about "creation science." Edwards
involved a Louisiana statute enacted under the title "The Balanced Treatment
for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public Schools Instruction Act."
Though declared in its title as having been enacted for a secular educational
purpose, the statute was challenged on the ground that it was enacted to foster
a particular religious belief, in violation of the establishment clause of the first
amendment, which clause has been extended by the fourteenth amendment to
state action, including enactment of state statutes.
Who decides, and how, whether the Louisiana legislature enacted this
statute with an entirely secular purpose rather than with a purpose forbidden
by the establishment clause?
Who? Edwards provides us with an authoritative answer-the Supreme
Court of the United States.
How? One part of the answer is that it was decided, not altogether sur-
prisingly, by a less than unanimous Court. This premise fact was disputed. A
second part of the answer is that in none of the opinions is there a reference
even to legislative fact or, of course, to what I have called similar things. At
least there is no explicit reference.
The thought may have crossed your mind that this is a rather powerful
demonstration of lack of support in precedent for my Tenth Principle-that a
court deciding a dispute about a fact that it uses as a premise of its reasoned
decision of an issue of law has the dual obligation of reasoned decision making
not only about the substantive issue on which the opinions focused but also
about its method of deciding the disputed factual premise.
If we take that view of Edwards v. Aguillard, then I must restate my
Tenth Principle not as part of a summary of existing law, but as a trial judge's
respectful plea to adopt the Tenth Principle for the future, because we federal
[Vol. 73:1
PREMISE FACTS
tention. In the process of improving common practice in the
ways suggested, we will have brought out into the open and ex-
amined more thoughtfully our procedures for deciding premise
facts, including procedures that some have called, in the
broadest sense, taking judicial notice. By practicing constraint
against unexplained judicial notice, by candidly and explicitly
acknowledging the distinctive nature of disputes over premise
facts, and by using flexibly adapted procedures, we should be
able to improve decision making and come closer to our aim of
doing justice lawfully.
APPENDICES
I. A TRIAL COURT LOG OF ADDITIONAL CASES
Having encountered premise-fact disputes in several dis-
tinct contexts, my law clerks and I started a Chambers Log in
early 1987. The Log recites instances in which we explicitly
thought about premise facts while adjudicating disputes placed
before a single federal judge under a random draw of cases in a
metropolitan court. We did not always report our thoughts in
trial judges, along with the trial bar and other state and federal judges, need
more explicit guidance.
I doubt that Edwards is fairly read, however, as rejecting the Tenth Prin-
ciple. My proposed phrasing of the Tenth Principle starts, "[w]here there is no
precedent regarding a method for deciding premise facts," and continues, "the
court has the dual obligation of reasoned decision making about method and
disclosure of reasons" (emphasis added). Edwards involved an issue of dis-
puted legislative intent, a very special kind of legislative-fact issue. For this
special kind of legislative-fact issue, we have an enormous body of precedent
that defines some additional constraints on judicial method-constraints be-
yond those addressed in my Twelve Principles. The clashing opinions of the
Supreme Court Justices in Edwards were all reasoned from legal premises
(precedents) within that more specialized body of law.
Relating the whole body of law on legislative intent to the Twelve Princi-
ples identified in this lecture is a very large subject in itself, and, having al-
luded to it, I do not propose to address it further here. See supra note 14.
I close with a further tribute to Lewis Carroll. The highest form of praise
is, of course, imitation. My closing parody does not pretend to imitate the pre-
science and subtlety of Lewis Carroll, but only his verse form.
Who knows now what ill will be
Tomorrow's asbestosis?
If know they must to make the law
About, let's say, thrombosis,
Our courts should use more
reasoned ways
Than knowing by osmosis.
"Knowing by osmosis" is a metaphorical description of unexplained judi-
cial notice. See supra note 1 and discussion of the Ninth and Tenth Principles,
supra text accompanying notes 99-115.
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memoranda of decision. We often concluded that it was unnec-
essary to decide disputes about premise facts, or, for reasons as-
sociated with constraints on a trial judge, that it was
inappropriate to explain the complex nature of issues that were
easily decided in any event. I hope that even the entries that
were part of our unpublished ruminations nevertheless may
contribute to understanding the scope and pervasiveness of the
problems that are the subject of this Article.148
A. CASE FOUR: COMPUTER SOFTWARE PROGRAMS
Plaintiff and defendant are competitors in the business of
marketing computer software programs. Plaintiff has sued for
alleged violations of one of its copyrights, claiming that some of
the screen displays that defendant has marketed are substan-
tially similar to some of plaintiff's screen displays. Defendant
argues that screen displays created by a computer software pro-
gram are not copyrightable because it is a scientific fact that
any screen display created by any software program could also
be created in some other way by an entirely different software
program having no substantial similarity. Defendant therefore
acknowledges that .there is a genuine fact dispute concerning
whether the screen displays are substantially similar, but con-
tends that this is not a dispute material to disposition of the
case and that the action should be dismissed. Plaintiff responds
that the motion to dismiss should be denied because the alleged
scientific fact is disputed.
Question: Who decides, and how, whether a screen dis-
play created by any one software program could also be created
in some other way by a second, entirely different, software pro-
gram having no substantial similarity to the first?
It is well settled that the courts treat the issue of substan-
148. One reason I have told you this much about the source of these issues
is to give you a basis for judging for yourself how often issues like these arise
in federal trial courts. In the District of Massachusetts, all the judges sitting
in Boston (now 11) receive a random draw of various categories of cases. The
method by which I selected these particular issues from all those before me
was not random, however. Instead, I selected all cases that occurred within a
three-month period-April to June, 1987-in which I thought that an issue
presented for ruling involved disputed premise facts, as well as scattered in-
stances from my docket, before and after that quarter. I also added a case
from the docket of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Case One).
Now I will place before you several more cases, each based on or extrapo-
lated from some other case before me. Cases Four, Five, and Six are adapted
from entries on my log for the second quarter of 1987.
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tial similarity in copyright cases as an adjudicative-fact ques-
tion, which cannot be decided on a motion to dismiss if there is
any genuine dispute about it. Is the dispute in this case, about
the truth of the asserted scientific fact, an adjudicative-fact
question or is it a premise-fact question bearing on the legal de-
termination of whether computer screen displays are
copyrightable?
B. CASE FIVE: BANK ROBBERIES
Defendant is accused of robbing a bank. The government
offered evidence that defendant held an empty brown bag, an
opaque plastic bottle, and an electronic device in the teller's
view and said: "This bottle contains enough explosive to blow
us all away. If I press the button on the remote control, it's all
over. Fill up the brown bag with bills-big bills. Now!" The
teller filled the bag with bills.
Defendant invoked the insanity statute as a defense. The
applicable statute says a person is not criminally responsible if,
at the time of acting, "as a result of a severe mental disease or
defects [he] was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts."149 Defendant called a psychia-
trist to the stand. After the psychiatrist testified that defend-
ant was, at the time of the bank robbery, suffering from a
severe mental disease, the direct examination proceeded:
Q. Have you an opinion, to a reasonable degree of certainty, as
to whether defendant, at the time he was in the bank, was able to ap-
preciate the wrongfulness of his act?
A. Ido.
Q. What is that opinion?
Assistant U. S. Attorney ("AUSA"): Objection, Your Honor.
The AUSA contends that the psychiatrist's report discloses that
the psychiatrist's opinion is based on an erroneous view of the
law, specifically, an erroneous interpretation of the word appre-
ciate.150 The AUSA explains that he expects the defense wit-
ness to testify that psychiatrists use the term appreciate to
involve affect as well as cognition. He adds that this witness
will express the view, contrary to the opinion of a government
witness, that the defendant could not have the affect required
149. 18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
150. A distinct issue, not discussed here, is whether the proffered evidence




to appreciate wrongfulness unless he was able to feel that what
he was doing was wrong and feel remorse for having done it.
Question: Who decides, and how, whether at the time the
defendant acted he was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness
of his act because of a severe mental disease?
It may happen that both judge and jury participate in the
decision. To see how, we must break the question down into
law and fact elements, and the latter into adjudicative facts and
premise facts. With these points in mind, I frame still another
question.
Question: Who decides, and how, whether it is true that a
defendant did not appreciate the wrongful quality of his con-
duct if, although he knew that the law prohibited his conduct
and that it was wrongful by community moral standards, his af-
fect was such that he could not feel that what he was doing was
wrong and could not feel remorse for having done it?
One might argue that this is not a fact question but a ques-
tion of law-a question of interpretation of a word used in the
statute. That is the way we would ordinarily hear this matter
argued and decided in the courtroom.
A responsive argument for the defendant is that the stat-
ute includes a word in common usage in the psychiatric com-
munity, and the meaning of that word is therefore a fact issue
for the jury if psychiatric expert testimony in a particular case
presents a dispute of fact about that usage on which reasonable
jurors might differ. This argument depends, however, on the
unstated premise that this fact dispute is a dispute over an ad-
judicative-fact question.
If this is a premise-fact dispute, then it will not be subject
to case-by-case decision, but will be decided in the manner that
questions of law are decided. Trial judges will decide in the
first instance, but appellate courts may, and probably will, de-
cide by a no-deference standard rather than reviewing only to
determine whether the trial court finding was clearly errone-
ous. That is essential to maintaining an answer that applies to
all cases alike-an answer that is precedent.
In the circumstances of this case, the trial court should sus-
tain the AUSA's objection if the court interprets the statute as
the AUSA contends it should be interpreted. Any dispute of
fact relevant to deciding the meaning of appreciate as used in
the statute is a dispute over a premise fact that the court re-
solves in deciding the legal issue regarding the meaning of ap-
preciate. The jury should not hear opinion evidence that is
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premised on an erroneous interpretation of the statute.151
C. CASE Six: WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
In a nonjury admiralty case, the trial judge asked an econo-
mist to state his assumptions about the legal measure of recov-
ery. The economist answered that he understood it was
appropriate to do calculations in accordance with the Massachu-
setts Wrongful Death Act, and then proceeded to recite his un-
derstanding of the Act. When the economist finished, the trial
judge asked plaintiff's counsel if plaintiff contended either that
the Massachusetts Act applied or that the Act was as generous
as the economist had stated. Plaintiff's counsel answered that
he hoped the Act was that generous but could cite no precedent
to support that interpretation; he added that in any event plain-
tiff was claiming under admiralty precedents rather than the
Massachusetts Act.152
Too many experts fundamentally misunderstand their role.
An expert should be a witness, not an advocate. In the legal
system in action, as distinguished from the one we profess to
have in theory, the great majority of expert witnesses do not
perform solely as genuine expert witnesses. Rather, they be-
come advocates.
151. Opinion testimony that ought to be excluded because it is based on an
erroneous but unstated legal premise often comes into evidence without objec-
tion. This has occurred even more frequently under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence than before they went into effect. The Federal Rules permit an opinion
to be stated before all the assumptions underlying it have been disclosed, "un-
less the court requires otherwise." FED. R. EvID. 705. But that rule was
designed, in part at least, to avoid the delays and injustice that often occurred
under older practice when the proponent of expert testimony was inept at lay-
ing all the technical groundwork. I submit that a common sense interpreta-
tion of the present rules of evidence makes it appropriate for the trial court to
require disclosure of the expert's assumptions, which might be done outside
the jury's hearing, when the court has reason to be concerned that the expert
may have based opinions on assumptions about the law that are contrary to
the court's expected rulings.
152. Cases Five and Six illustrate some of the recurring problems about the
role of expert testimony in the administration of justice. Expert testimony is
the subject of much of the remainder of Appendix I. It is an excellent exam-
ple of an area in which distinguishing between premise-fact decisions and adju-
dicative-fact findings is likely to help us come closer to our aim of doing justice
lawfully. This is an area in which it has not been customary even to allude to
the distinction, yet one in which the nature of many of the problems we en-
counter involves decision making in relation to both premise facts and adjudi-
cative facts and often without adverting to the precedents that bear on that
distinction. Another reason I select this area for special focus is that, in my
view, it is one of the areas of law in action with respect to which there is great
need for improvement in the performance of our legal system.
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We, the professionals, are primarily responsible for the
dysfunctional elements of this state of affairs. Trial rules and
practices should prohibit experts from giving legal opinions.
Judges should not, however, place the blame solely on the law-
yer-advocates. If judges acquiesce in the abuses, they create in-
centives for continuing this unwanted behavior by both the
lawyer-advocates and the experts. The lawyer-advocate re-
sponds to the judicially-created incentive to engage the expert
who will express under oath the most partisan opinions. The
expert responds to the opportunity that judicial acquiescence
and partisan rewards present, and the expert shifts to the role
of advocate rather than functioning solely or even primarily in
the role of expert witness.
1 53
One basic question to consider is whether the subject on
which the expert testimony is proffered is a proper subject of
expert testimony. Trial judges repeatedly are asked to receive
in evidence before a jury an expert opinion on some aspect of
law. Is that proper? The answer to this question bears most
fundamentally on the quality of adjudication. Experts should
not be permitted to usurp or impede the judge's function of ex-
plaining law. Nor should experts be permitted to usurp jury
functions.15
II. CASE ONE REVISITED
The state law that the Third Circuit scrutinized in Asbestos
Litigation developed through decisions over a span of twenty
153. One useful step for judges to take is to recognize and discharge their
responsibility for requiring that expert opinion be limited to its defined role
and not be allowed by shrewd advocacy to usurp the functions of the court as
the source of authoritative guidance to jurors on the legal issues that frame
adjudicative-fact questions. Performing this judicial function well will require
careful attention to identification and separate consideration of premise-fact
questions.
154. Inappropriate allowance of expert testimony also has implications for
the costs to parties and to the public of resolving disputes. In his opinion in
Asbestos Litigation, Judge Weis observed that concern about expert testimony
influenced the New Jersey Supreme Court:
In reaching its decision, the Beshada court considered the possi-
bility that a jury might become confused by the testimony of experts
who would "speculate as to what knowledge was feasible in a given
year." Consequently, the court opined that it should "resist legal
rules that will so greatly add to the costs both sides incur in trying a
case."
In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1244 (3d Cir. 1987) (citing Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 207-08, 477 A.2d 539, 548 (1982)),
cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
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years or more, culminating in what Judge Becker termed "the
Beshada-Feldman-Fischer trilogy."'155 Let us assume that the
three decisions reasonably may be read as establishing a rule
for asbestosis cases that is somewhat different from the rule re-
garding a state-of-the-art defense in other strict product liabil-
ity cases.
In Asbestos Litigation, the Third Circuit concluded, in re-
viewing the state law at issue-that is, the decisional rules that
a state-of-the-art defense is available in general in products lia-
bility cases but not in asbestos cases-that it should apply the
rational-basis standard.156
Applying this test, Judge Weis added:
Moreover, we must not overlook the importance of allocating the
burden of proof. In equal protection cases, those who challenge state
law must convince the court that the factual assumptions on which
the classification is apparently based could not reasonably be con-
ceived as true by the governmental decision maker. We cannot say
that the asbestos manufacturers have met that burden
1 57
Only one of the three Third Circuit panel opinions, Judge
Becker's, explicitly addresses the question I have stated here as
my Question One: Who decides, and how, whether asbestos
hazards were knowable to the industry in the 1930s? Judge
Becker's answer is that the New Jersey Supreme Court decided
that question by a method permissible for disputed premise
facts. 158 Although Judge Becker joins in portions of Judge
Weis's opinion, he does not concur in that part of Judge Weis's
opinion quoted immediately above. In Judge Becker's words:
*.. I do not believe that Judge Weis has identified with sufficient pre-
cision the New Jersey Supreme Court's reasons for making the dis-
tinction under review, a distinction I believe to be supported by a
valid government objective and rational within our equal protection
jurisprudence. Specifically, I believe that, on the basis of adjudicative
facts determined in cases that had the full panoply of procedural pro-
tections, the New Jersey Supreme Court has determined a legislative
fact-that the hazards of asbestos exposure were knowable to the in-
dustry at all relevant times. The subject of legislative factfinding is
rarely discussed in the jurisprudence, and I write separately to ex-
plain why I think it validates the New Jersey Supreme Court's
distinction.159
155. Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d at 1245 (Becker, J., concurring).
156. Id at 1235-40.
157. l at 1243.
158. The method used was not permissible, however, for adjudicative facts.
See ici at 1249 n.6 (Becker, J., concurring) (distinguishing legislative and adju-
dicative facts).
159. I- at 1245 (Becker, J., concurring).
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The two opinions are compatible, however, with respect to
the applicability of the rational-basis standard of scrutiny.160
The passage just quoted from Judge Becker's opinion supports
the rational-basis standard and Judge Weis explains the choice
of that standard in this way:
It is by now well established that in confronting a problem in the
area of economic and social welfare, a state does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications drawn by its laws
are imperfect. "If the classification has some 'reasonable basis,' it
does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification 'is
not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality.'"
Having determined that the nature of the right asserted here
does not place it in a category requiring heightened scrutiny, we must
now consider whether the judicial rather than legislative origin of the
alleged infringement mandates a more searching review.
We are not convinced that either the nature of the subject matter
or the procedure utilized in arriving at the challenged ruling consti-
tutes sufficient grounds for requiring a stricter standard of review for
common law decisions subjected to equal protection attacks.
160. The two opinions do, however, take somewhat different routes of rea-
soning in applying the rational-basis test to the distinction made, explicitly or
implicitly, in the Beshada-Feldman-Fischer trilogy. This can be observed, for
example, by comparing the passage last quoted above from Judge Becker's
opinion with the last two paragraphs just quoted from Judge Weis's opinion.
The contrast between the two opinions with respect to application of the
rational-basis test in this particular instance is underscored by a passage from
Judge Becker's opinion, which captures the difference between his position
and that of Judge Weis in the following way:
Appellants complain that the New Jersey Supreme Court de-
prives manufacturers and distributors of asbestos-containing products
of the state-of-the-art defense in products liability/failure to warn ac-
tions, which other manufacturers and distributors are entitled to as-
sert in the same kind of lawsuits. Appellants urge that no rational
theoretical basis exists for differentiating between these classes of liti-
gants. Judge Weis in his opinion demonstrates that [it] is not clear
that all other manufacturers may take advantage of the state-of-the-
art defense, although he agrees that New Jersey "does treat asbestos
cases differently than other product liability cases." Weis Op., at 1241.
I believe that we need not find constitutional infirmity even if we as-
sume for the sake of argument appellants' worst case scenario, i.e.,
that New Jersey singles out the asbestos industry.
As I read the New Jersey Supreme Court's cases, the court does
not deny asbestos defendants the state-of-the-art defense on theoreti-
cal grounds. Instead, I believe that the New Jersey court, via the
Beshada-Feldman-Fischer trilogy, has determined a legislative fact-
that, at all relevant times, asbestosis harms were knowable to the in-
dustry. That being the case, the New Jersey Supreme Court has rea-
sonably decided to preclude endless relitigation of what was
"knowable" to the asbestos industry.
Id. (section caption and footnote omitted).
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One other element present here-case management-tips the
scale in favor of the state court ruling. The Beshada court gave prime
consideration to this concern, a subject in which the expertise of a
court substantially outweighs that of a legislature and deserves due
deference.
Taking the significant elements entering into the state court's
ruling and balancing them against the valid competency concerns of
court and legislature, we discern no measurable imbalance that weak-
ens the presumption of regularity attaching to the state's choice of al-
ternatives. Considering the social, economic, and administrative
nature of the issues before the state court, we cannot say that its ac-
tion in deciding the state-of-the-art defense question warrants strict
scrutiny. We therefore conclude that the rational basis test is applica-
ble to the classification drawn by the Beshada and Feldman courts.
1 6 1
III. APPLYING SETTLED LAW
A. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN MAKING AND APPLYING LAW AND
AMONG KINDS OF DECISIONS APPLYING LAW
Four different types of decisions have been identified
above.'62 The first three are lawmaking decisions (1) by a legis-
lature enacting a statute, (2) by a court or agency engaging in
rule making, and (3) by a court deciding an issue of first im-
pression or overruling a precedent. The fourth involves apply-
ing settled law to a case before the court. This fourth type of
decision is complex and requires close examination to distin-
guish between those applications of settled law that involve de-
termining some fact that is a premise for deciding an issue of
law and those applications of settled law that depend only on
determining adjudicative-fact disputes.
A premise fact of the fourth subcategory is one that serves
as a premise for a court's reasoned decision of a relatively nar-
row issue of law-a relatively more particular rule of law that,
in the court's reasoning, determines whether some previously
settled and more general rule of law applies to the case before
the court. Some determinations of relatively narrow issues of
law are commonly referred to as rulings. When a disputed fact
is a premise for the court's reasoned decision of an issue of law,
that disputed fact is a premise fact even though the legal rule
or ruling is one of relatively narrow or limited applicability.
An interpretation of the scope of the definition of premise
facts broad enough to include facts serving as premises for a
161. 829 F.2d at 1239-40 (citations omitted).
162. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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ruling, as distinguished from a decision, is supported by a pas-
sage in the advisory committee's note to Rule 201(a), stating:
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legisla-
tive facts, on the other hand, are those which have relevance to legal
reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in the formulation of a
legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a
legislative body.
163
One of the different nuances of rule and ruling is that the term
ruling is not ordinarily used to describe lawmaking. For this
reason it seems unlikely that the advisory committee would
have used the term ruling if it had meant what it called legisla-
tive facts to be limited to lawmaking facts. This interpretation
of the advisory committee note is reinforced by examples the
note gives of the "use of non-evidence facts in evaluating the
adjudicative facts of the case"' 64 to decide whether the evidence
is sufficient to survive a motion for "nonsuit."' 65
Because the fourth subcategory of premise facts extends to
facts used in making rulings as well as rules, it is quite broad.
Its exact scope may be a matter of dispute because distinguish-
ing between an adjudicative fact and a premise fact is difficult
in this fourth subcategory.
The difficulty of distinguishing between adjudicative facts
and premise facts is illustrated by a substantial body of pub-
lished materials regarding constitutional fact review. The
phrase constitutional facts, in this context, is sometimes used to
refer to factual premises that supporters use to enact a consti-
tutional provision (premise facts of one type) and factual prem-
ises courts use to determine the validity of a statute under
constitutional criteria (premise facts of another type). At other
times the phrase constitutional facts is used to refer to adjudi-
cative facts. An example of a dispute often treated as adjudica-
tive is the dispute over whether a publisher of a particular
statement knew of its falsity.1
66
163. FED. R. EVID. 201(a) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
164. Id. Further development of this point appears infra text accompany-
ing notes 174-75.
165. FED. R. EviD. 201(a) advisory committee's note.
166. For example, Professor Henry Monaghan treats as a constitutional-
fact issue the question of whether the defendant published its article with
knowledge that what it said was false in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466
U.S. 485, 486 (1984). A court may be deciding an adjudicative fact rather than
a premise fact when it determines whether the publisher knew of the state-
ment's falsity in a context in which the court examines that dispute not for
the purpose of elaborating the legal norm of reckless disregard of truth or fal-
sity, as used in First Amendment cases, but simply for the purpose of deciding
whether the claimant has proved reckless disregard by clear and convincing
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Professor Monaghan explains that courts also may use
facts as a basis for modifying a legal norm. Facts that a court
uses in this way are premise facts in the sense in which I am
using that term. Although Professor Monaghan uses the term
constitutional facts to mean only adjudicative facts, 6 7 he
makes the point that labels-including such phrases as question
of fact, question of law, and mixed question of law and fact-
should not be allowed to constrain thoughtful consideration of
substantive issues at stake.168
In Miller v. Fenton'69 the Supreme Court made a similar
point. Responding to a contention that the presumption of cor-
rectness of state court findings prescribed in a federal statute' 70
limited the function of federal courts, including the Supreme
Court, to determining whether a state court finding of "volun-
tariness" of a confession was "clearly erroneous," the Court
explains:
Perhaps much of the difficulty in this area stems from the practi-
cal truth that the decision to label an issue a "question of law," a
"question of fact," or a "mixed question of law and fact" is sometimes
as much a matter of allocation as it is of analysis. At least in those
instances in which Congress has not spoken and in which the issue
falls somewhere between a pristine legal standard and a simple his-
torical fact, the fact/law distinction at times has turned on a determi-
nation that, as a matter of the sound administration of justice, one
judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question. Where, for example, as with proof of actual malice in First
Amendment libel cases, the relevant legal principle can be given
meaning only through its application to the particular circumstances
of a case, the Court has been reluctant to give the trier of fact's con-
clusions presumptive force and, in so doing, strip a federal appellate
evidence in the particular case. The use of the phrase constitutional facts in
this adjudicative-fact sense is illuminated by Professor Monaghan in an article
published in 1985. See Monaghan, supra note 34, at 241; see also Miller v. Fen-
ton, 474 U.S. 104, 112-18 (1985) (O'Connor, J., for the Court; Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting) (explaining Court's decision to treat issue of "voluntariness" of
confession as "a legal question meriting independent consideration in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding" and therefore not within scope of presumption of
correctness of findings of fact of state courts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Some
implications of Miller v. Fenton are discussed immediately below.
167. Professor Monaghan identifies the problem of "the scope of judicial
review of the adjudicative facts decisive of constitutional claims" as a "sys-
temic issue" of constitutional-fact review. Monaghan, supra note 34, at 230
(emphasis added). He adds that constitutional-fact review "does not implicate
the legislative facts that underlie the statute or regulation." Id. at 231 n.16.
168. Id. at 238.
169. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
170. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1982) (governing federal habeas corpus pro-
ceedings with respect to state convictions).
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court of its primary function as an expositor of law. Similarly, on rare
occasions in years past the Court has justified independent federal or
appellate review as a means of compensating for "perceived shortcom-
ings of the trier of fact by way of bias or some other factor. ... "
In contrast, other considerations often suggest the appropriate-
ness of resolving close questions concerning the status of an issue as
one of "law" or "fact" in favor of extending deference to the trial
court. When, for example, the issue involves the credibility of wit-
nesses and therefore turns largely on an evaluation of demeanor,
there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process
of applying law to fact to the trial court and according its determina-
tions presumptive weight. There the Court stressed that the state
trial judge is in a position to assess juror bias that is far superior to
that of federal judges reviewing an application for a writ of habeas
corpus. Principally for that reason, the decisions held, juror bias mer-
its treatment as a "factual issue" within the meaning of § 2254(d)
notwithstanding the intimate connection between such determina-
tions and the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury.
For several reasons we think that it would be inappropriate to
abandon the Court's longstanding position that the ultimate question
of the admissibility of a confession merits treatment as a legal inquiry
requiring plenary federal review....
In addition to considerations of stare decisis and congressional in-
tent, the nature of the inquiry itself lends support to the conclusion
that "voluntariness" is a legal question meriting independent consid-
eration in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Although sometimes
framed as an issue of "psychological fact," the dispositive question of
the voluntariness of a confession has always had a uniquely legal di-
mension. It is telling that in confession cases coming from the States,
this Court has consistently looked to the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to test admissibility. The locus of the right is
significant because it reflects the Court's consistently held view that
the admissibility of a confession turns as much on whether the tech-
niques for extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are
compatible with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a
conviction will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether
the defendant's will was in fact overborne. This hybrid quality of the
voluntariness inquiry, subsuming, as it does, a "complex of values," it-
self militates against treating the question as one of simple historical
fact.
Putting to one side whether "voluntariness" is analytically more
akin to a fact or a legal conclusion, the practical considerations that
have led us to find other issues within the scope of the § 2254(d) pre-
sumption are absent in the confession context....
... We reiterate our confidence that state judges, no less than
their federal counterparts, will properly discharge their duty to pro-
tect the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. We note only
that in the confession context, independent federal review has tradi-
tionally played an important parallel role in protecting the rights at





The reasoning of the Court in Miller v. Fenton, though not
using the terms premise fact or legislative fact, underscores the
point that the question of who decides and how depends in part,
at least, upon the Supreme Court's decision that "one judicial
actor is better positioned than another to decide the issue in
question."'172 This determination allocates the function of de-
ciding the issue, even if deciding it involves deciding a disputed
fact as well as legal norms defining the nature and relevance of
that fact. Although Justice (now Chief Justice) Rehnquist dis-
sented from this allocative determination, his opinion is not in-
consistent with the points for which the Court's opinion is cited
here.173
In defamation cases, if a decision maker (court or jury)
merely applies the meaning of reckless disregard as settled in
precedents (which are explained in the trial court's charge to
the jury, if a jury is deciding) and decides that the evidence of-
fered by the claimant in this case does or does not prove reck-
less disregard with convincing clarity, the decision maker may
be using the determination of this fact dispute solely for an ad-
judicative rather than a premise purpose.
One must be cautious about reaching this conclusion, how-
ever, because of a point underscored in the advisory commit-
tee's notes on Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
Committee was commenting on a court's use of "non-evidence"
facts reported in a table of automobile stopping distances as a
premise for deciding (a) that a defendant could not have
stopped her car in time to avoid striking a child who suddenly
appeared in the highway, and (b) that the evidence for plaintiff
was therefore insufficient to go to the jury. "It is apparent,"
the advisory committee declared, "that this use of non-evidence
facts in evaluating the adjudicative facts of the case is not an
appropriate subject for a formalized judicial notice treat-
171. 474 U.S. at 113-18 (footnotes and citations omitted). Note, however,
the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist, id at 118-19 ("I think it is difficult to
sensibly distinguish the determination that a particular confession was volun-
tary from the determinations we have held to be entitled to a presumption of
correctness under § 2254(d).").
172. Id. at 114.
173. Some additional evidence of Chief Justice Rehnquist's views on legis-
lative facts appears in his opinion for the Court in Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 168-69 n.3 (1986) ("We are far from persuaded, however, that the
'clearly erroneous' standard of Rule 52(a) applies to the kind of 'legislative'
facts at issue here.").
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ment."174 Because the formal rule of evidence regarding judi-
cial notice governs judicial notice of adjudicative facts,175 this
note seems to say that the example given is one involving a de-
cision of premise facts or, in terminology the advisory commit-
tee used, "nonadjudicative facts."
In contrast with merely deciding the sufficiency of the evi-
dence, if the court (whether trial court or appellate court) con-
cludes that existing precedents on reckless disregard and
convincing clarity provide insufficient guidance and require fur-
ther elaboration of the meaning of the terms, the elaboration of
the legal norm the court then develops will be applicable and
useful not only in the case at hand but also in like cases. When
elaborating a norm in this way, a court is making a decision
that will be precedent (unless overturned by a higher court).
When the court acts in this way, almost certainly the ultimate
decision of the adjudicative fact as to whether the defendant
publisher acted with reckless disregard in the particular case
(by whomever that issue is decided) will also be accompanied in
the case at hand by decision of another fact dispute on a some-
what more generalized basis that will apply to other like cases.
For example, elaboration of the legal norm of reckless disre-
gard may be based on an explicit or implicit determination (of
evaluative fact) that robust public discussion of issues of public
interest and concern will be inhibited substantially unless the
standard for reckless disregard requires a state of mind of
knowledge of a strong likelihood of falsity. Similar elaboration
may determine the standard for convincing clarity to be very
close to beyond reasonable doubt. This evaluative factual deter-
mination is used as a premise for deciding an issue of law con-
cerned with further elaboration of the legal norms invoked by
the phrases reckless disregard and convincing clarity. This fac-
tual determination is a premise-fact determination.176
Another illustration of an area of law potentially involving
a dispute about applying a settled constitutional rule that may
lead a court to treat a particular dispute as an adjudicative-fact
dispute if it takes one course of reasoning or as a premise-fact
dispute if it takes another course of reasoning is that area con-
174. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
175. I&
176. I submit that a similar analysis distinguishing premise facts from adju-
dicative facts is applicable to problems of constitutional fact review bearing on
"whether a confession was voluntary and whether a conviction was tainted by
race discrimination in jury selection." See, e.g., G. ROBINSON, E. GELL-ORN &
H. BRUFF, THE ADMINIsTRATivE PRocEss 150 (3d ed. 1986).
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cerning application of the "minimum contacts" test for personal
jurisdiction of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.177 If the
court develops a further elaboration of the norms associated
with the minimum contacts test, it is making law, and any fact
determination it makes as a premise for the elaboration of the
norms is a premise-fact determination. The court may make a
fact determination, however, solely for the purpose of resolving
credibility issues that determine whether in the case before the
court the proof offered has shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the party haled into court did in fact have the
particular contacts with the state that the plaintiff claimed, and
that the historical facts were sufficient to satisfy the norms es-
tablished in previous judicial decisions. A determination used
for this latter purpose is an adjudicative-fact finding.
Part of the difficulty of distinguishing between adjudicative
and premise facts concerns the mixture of historical and evalu-
ative facts involved on both sides of the distinctions. Knowl-
edge or lack of knowledge of a fact at a particular time in the
past is a historical fact, and in decision making in the courts it
is ordinarily, although not always, used as an adjudicative fact.
Like voluntariness, however, knowledge of hazards-
whether asbestos hazards or any other kind of hazards-is a
more complex idea. Indeed, knowledge of hazard is in some re-
spects even more complex than voluntariness. Any notion of
hazard or risk is a construct of the mind, not a reality totally
external to the mind. It is a notion invented by the human
mind to manage problems in human relations existing when we
know part but not all of the facts relevant to making a decision.
It is a device for managing ignorance.178 Thus, because hazard
is itself a concept involving a mixture of historical fact and pre-
diction based on incomplete knowledge of the past and current
forces at work in some changing set of circumstances, knowl-
edge of a particular hazard is necessarily an idea at least as
complex as hazard itself. It is more so to the extent that it may
imply that one may have knowledge of hazard without knowl-
edge of everything implicit in the definition of that hazard.
In view of these facts about what we mean when we use
the term hazard, one may say that the state of knowledge of
hazards of asbestos products at a particular time is a mixture of
historical fact-what was known-and abstraction-the concept
of hazard, which exists only as a construct of human minds.
177. 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
178. See R. KEETON & A. WiDiss, INsuRANCE LAw § 1.3(b) (1988).
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Knowability of hazards is an exceptionally complex idea.
In the first place, knowability involves some elements of histor-
ical fact as to what was known by some group or groups of per-
sons. A decision of the issue of knowability therefore involves
both a determination of any dispute about historical facts as to
what some group or groups knew and a determination of any
dispute about the evaluative facts as to the meaning of hazards
of asbestos and as to what was knowable by others.
Knowability of hazards of asbestos products at a particular time
is a still more complex idea, because it involves some norm of
accessibility at that time of information that bears upon a rea-
soned assessment of hazards of asbestos. For example, is it
enough that one, or a dozen, academic or industrial researchers
knew all that was then known to anyone that was relevant to
assessing the hazards, or must their writings have been widely
disseminated before what they have discovered is deemed to be
knowable in the industry?
If the fact dispute about historical facts is distinctive to the
particular case and not even moderately generalized, its resolu-
tion affects only the particular case and it is adjudicative. A
court may determine, however, that other elements of
knowability of hazards of asbestos products at a particular time
are premises for decisions of an issue of law, or premise facts.
Moreover, even knowledge as a historical fact may be an
adjudicative fact or a premise fact, depending on how the court
uses it in decision making. A court may use knowledge of as-
bestos hazards in a way that serves as a basis for deciding only
the one case at bar, as is true when the rule of law adopted is
that a defendant's knowledge is a prerequisite to that defend-
ant's liability; under that rule of law, knowledge is treated as
an adjudicative fact. A genuine dispute about it is submitted to
each jury case by case with potentially inconsistent findings. If
the court determines, on the other hand, to reject a state-of-
the-art defense because enough manufacturers knew enough
about asbestos hazards that the court should adopt a legal rule
that asbestos hazards were knowable to all manufacturers, the
court has used its determination of knowledge by some as a
premise of its reasoned decision that asbestos hazards were
knowable to all. The court's determination of knowledge-a
historical fact-was a premise-fact determination that served as
a premise of its adopting a legal rule on knowable hazards.
Often a contrast will exist between the way a court uses a
determination of a historical fact of knowledge and the way it
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uses some associated evaluative fact in its decision making. For
example, knowledge or lack of knowledge of falsity of a state-
ment that is the subject of an action for defamation is a histori-
cal fact. There is a material difference between using a
determination of a historical fact of knowledge, or lack of
knowledge, of falsity of a published statement as an adjudica-
tive fact, relevant to deciding only the defamation case before
the court, and, for example, using, as a basis for elaborating
norms to be applied in defamation cases, an evaluative determi-
nation concerning the effect of one or another rule upon robust
debate of issues of public interest.
Using a determination of knowledge just to decide the case
before the court differs materially from using an evaluative de-
termination to decide whether the evidence bearing on this ad-
judicative-fact dispute about knowledge of falsity in the
particular case is or is not sufficient to support a jury finding of
knowledge of falsity as that adjudicative fact is defined by law.
This evaluative determination is analogous to the illustration
appearing in the advisory committee's note on Rule 201 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence regarding a court's use of a table of
automobile stopping distances to aid it in determining the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to go to the jury in a case involving in-
jury to a child who suddenly appeared in front of defendant's
vehicle.179 The numerous judicial evaluative determinations
about sufficiency of the evidence in defamation cases, as in
other types of cases, become precedents for future cases. The
jury findings of knowledge or lack of knowledge in those same
cases do not become precedents.
These illustrations are entirely consistent with the point
that the contrast between historical and evaluative facts cannot
be taken as the key to determining whether either kind of fact
determination is adjudicative or is instead a premise-fact deter-
mination. The key is ascertaining how the decision maker used
the fact determination, whether historical or evaluative. Was
the fact determination used only to decide the case at hand, or
was it used in a way that serves as a precedent that aids law-
yers to predict and courts to determine outcomes in future
analogous cases?
Sometimes courts have been very explicit about how they
used the determination in their decision making. This was
true, for example, in Miller v. Fenton.80 The Court was ex-
179. FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note.
180. 474 U.S. 104 (1985).
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plicit about both allocation of responsibility for the determina-
tion of voluntariness of a confession and about stare decisis
effect.18  Often one must read judicial opinions closely, how-
ever, in search of implicit indications of exactly whether and
how the court used a fact determination in its legal reasoning.
Some additional examples of the fourth subcategory of
premise facts may serve to underscore the large scope of this
subcategory and to aid us in understanding it and understand-
ing what courts have said and done in relation to issues in this
subcategory.
Consider Case Two-involving a dispute as to whether a
boxing association is engaged in state action when awarding or
withdrawing a championship title. A legislative decision has
been made that the sporting rules developed by the Marquis of
Queensberry are insufficient to govern modern bouts. That de-
cision inevitably has led to relationships between state regula-
tory officials and privately created boxing associations. The
decision of the state action issue may depend in part upon his-
torical facts about the relationship between a particular boxing
association and state administrative officials charged with regu-
lating boxing. In part, however, the answer may depend also
on applying a legal norm, either with or without further elabo-
ration, defining the meaning of state action as that concept is
used in the context of constitutional due process claims. Very
likely such an application of a legal norm, even without further
elaboration, will be made in a way that is precedent, binding
not only in relation to other awards and withdrawals of titles
by the same association, which is the ultimate reach of even the
most expansive doctrine of issue preclusion, but also in relation
to like awards by other similar associations. If that is the case,
then any fact determined as a premise of the reasoned decision
is used as a premise fact.
Another example is that, in order to decide an issue of law
as to whether identified precedents about federal preemption
apply to a claim of invalidity of a statute, a decision maker
must decide the truth or falsity of a disputed evaluative factual
assertion that an anti-balance-billing statute will cause reduced
elderly access to medical care. That fact dispute is a premise-
fact dispute, not an adjudicative-fact dispute, if the court uses
the factual determination as a basis for deciding the validity of
a statute against constitutional challenge-a decision that will
be precedent applicable to other potential challenges to the va-
181. Id. at 114, 115.
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lidity of that statute by other parties in other legal proceedings.
The decision will result in a precedent regarding validity of the
challenged statute and other similar legislation, and not merely
an adjudication of the rights of the parties before the court in
which the decision is made.
Other examples of the fourth subcategory include issues of
fact essential to deciding an issue of law that bears on the ad-
missibility of expert opinion.'8 2 For example, is the presence of
various symptoms, said by a proffered expert witness to consti-
tute together a "rape trauma syndrome," a scientifically relia-
ble method of proof, sufficiently probative to justify a
determination that an opinion based on presence of the syn-
drome is admissible in evidence as proof that an alleged victim
was raped? 8 3
Another frequently recurring type of problem bearing on
admissibility of expert testimony is presented when a dispute
exists about whether a proposed opinion proffered in the pres-
ence of a jury is not merely an opinion on a disputed-fact issue,
as is claimed by the proponent of the opinion testimony, but is
truly an opinion on a mixed question of law and adjudicative
fact, expressed in a way that does not disclose precisely what
view the expert is taking on the legal question involved. If the
latter is the true nature of the opinion, the court should ex-
clude the opinion testimony if there is doubt about whether the
factual part of the opinion is premised on a view of the law con-
sistent with instructions on the law the court has given or ex-
pects to give. If, on the other hand, it is clear that the opinion
the expert proposes to express is based on a correct under-
standing of the law by the witness and thus is not affected in
any way by forbidden assumptions of law, then the opinion may
be admissible. I do not suggest that determining whether the
proffered opinion is or is not premised on an incorrect view of
the applicable law necessarily involves deciding some dispute of
fact beyond the issue of what are the premises for the proffered
182. Examples beyond those discussed here are presented in Appendix I,
supra.
183. See State v. Black, 109 Wash. 2d 336, -, 745 P.2d 12, 15 (1987) (en
banc) (excluding expert testimony; no discussion, however, relating decision to
distinction between adjudicative and lawmaking fact); see also People v.
Hampton, 746 P.2d 947, 950-53 (Colo. 1987) (receiving rape trauma syndrome
evidence to assist factfinder in understanding reactions of rape victim who
delayed 89 days in reporting "date rape"; reversing intermediate appellate
court that had held evidence failed to meet Frye test; allowing evidence under
state evidence rules because it will assist trier of fact to understand evidence
or resolve fact in issue).
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opinion. Even so, that issue itself is a premise-fact issue, unless
we should decide to use premise fact in a slightly narrower
sense and develop another term for certain foundation facts
bearing on admissibility of evidence.184 Other premise facts
also may be premises for the ruling on admissibility of a prof-
fered opinion of an expert.
It will sometimes be difficult to distinguish between a ques-
tion of admissibility of evidence that turns on an issue of law
that itself depends on a fact determination and, on the other
hand, a question of admissibility that turns on a fact finding
that is used directly to decide the matter at hand and not to de-
termine an issue of law that then is applied to decide the mat-
ter at hand. A fact finding that merely resolves admissibility in
the case at hand in accordance with a rule of law otherwise es-
tablished (either in this case as a case of first impression or in
precedents establishing a settled rule) may be more like the
kinds of facts ordinarily decided by juries (adjudicative facts)
than facts serving as premises for deciding issues of law (prem-
ise facts). It is part of the basis for a ruling that does not de-
pend in any way upon premises of reasoning that use this
determination of fact in a way that applies beyond the case at
hand. This kind of ruling is not a precedent. Because this kind
of fact determination is not used as a premise fact, the court, in
reaching its fact determination, is not free to disregard formal
rules of evidence, as it is free to do in relation to issue-of-law
facts. Nevertheless, the formal rules of evidence in some in-
stances allow the court to make adjudicative-fact findings on
evidence it would be bound to hold inadmissible for other
purposes. 85
Difficult as it may be to elaborate and apply the distinction
between premise facts in the fourth subcategory and adjudica-
184. See supra note 19.
185. With respect to special provisions regarding the applicability of rules
of evidence to the court's consideration of a question of fact bearing on admis-
sibility, see, for example, FED. R. EviD. 104(a) (stating that preliminary ques-
tions concerning qualification of person as witness, existence of privilege, or
admissibility of evidence "shall be determined by the court," but in making its
determination the court "is not bound by the rules of evidence except those
with respect to privileges"); id. 104(b) (declaring that when a condition of fact
is essential to relevancy, evidence is to be received if "sufficient to support a
finding of fulfillment of the condition"); see also, e.g., United States v. Petroz-
ziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1977) (establishing a special procedure for court
findings on a preponderance of the evidence to support admissibility of a




tive facts, that distinction is one that we must contemplate
within a legal system that has different methods for resolving
disputes over adjudicative and premise facts.
B. TYPES OF DECISIONS APPLYING SETTLED LAW THAT
INVOLVE PREMISE-FACT DETERMINATIONS
Reviewing all the examples of decisions "applying" settled
law, we may observe several distinctive types of court decisions
that commonly involve the court's reliance on some fact deter-
mination as a premise for reasoned decision of an issue of law,
rather than relying on that fact determination to resolve the
case before the court without in any way adding another prece-
dent to the settled law.
First, the court may be using a fact determination as a
premise for building upon an established general norm by ad-
ding a supplementary norm that will apply to some group of
cases, though a group that is small in number compared with
the group to which the more general, settled norm applies.
Second, the court may be using a fact determination as a
premise for a decision that applies as precedent by, for exam-
ple, declaring a statute unconstitutional, or valid against consti-
tutional challenge, even though no elaboration of previously
established legal norms is part of the court's reasoning.
Third, the court may be using a fact determination as a
premise for its reasoning that the evidence in the case before
the court is, or is not, sufficient to support an adjudicative find-
ing of a fact that is an element of a cause of action or defense,
according to a previously settled legal norm. Even though no
further elaboration of the legal norm is a part of the court's
reasoning, the decision regarding sufficiency or insufficiency of
the evidence is an evaluative determination that, along with
similar determinations in other adjudicated cases, serves as pre-
cedent to guide lawyers and judges in making similar determi-
nations in future cases.' 8 6
It seems unlikely that these three identifiable ways of us-
ing premise-fact determinations in applying settled law exhaust
the range of possibilities. They do serve, however, to illustrate
two points. First, norm elaboration is not the only type of issue
of law presented for decision as a court applies settled law to a
case before the court. Second, in all these instances the court's
decision as to which some fact determination is a premise for
186. See sup'ra text accompanying notes 53-54.
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the court's reasoning, is principled in a way that applies at least
somewhat more generally than only to the case before the
court and other related cases affected by claim preclusion or is-
sue preclusion. The court's decision is thus a precedent and the
fact determination on which it was premised has served a
premise-fact purpose rather than an adjudicative purpose.
C. PURPOSE REVISITED
It may enhance an understanding of the distinction be-
tween adjudicative and premise facts to emphasize the nature
of that distinction, articulated as the Second Principle. The in-
herent nature of the fact in dispute does not determine
whether it is an adjudicative or a premise fact; rather, the dis-
tinction is based on the purpose for which the court uses the
fact determination. A court uses a premise-fact determination
as a premise for a reasoned decision of an issue of law which
will be precedent. In contrast, a court uses an adjudicative-fact
determination only as a premise for a decision in a particular
case which determines only the outcome of that case and is not
precedent. Thus, it may happen that a single dispute of fact
may be treated either as an adjudicative-fact dispute or as a
premise-fact dispute, depending on how the court resolves
other legal issues that determine the purpose for which this
fact dispute is material.
It may be suggested that, as a test for use by decision mak-
ers, the distinction I am advancing is circular, or that I am sim-
ply elaborating the implications of my definition of premise
facts and the characteristic that distinguishes them from adju-
dicative facts.
My answer is that I am making a point of substance about
the important differences between two ways of using fact deter-
minations in decision making. One way is to decide only the
case before the court-using them as adjudicative facts. The
other way is to use them as premises for establishing, as law, a
general norm, or for elaborating on a general norm by estab-
lishing subsidiary rules that apply not merely to deciding the
case before the court but to some additional body of like cases
as well (even though the number of cases expected to be within
the scope of the elaboration will be far fewer than those within
the scope of the more general norm). Some legal norms have
very broad and general application. Other legal norms have
more limited application. Every legal norm, however, applies
more broadly than merely to the case before the court. A legal
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norm applies for a reason (as precedent) and in a way different
from the impact of a decision of one case upon others by reason
of claim preclusion or issue preclusion. L8 7
187. A distinguished commentator has noted the phenomenon of a disputed
fact question that may be treated either as an adjudicative-fact question or as
what I have called a premise-fact question. He observed that the way the fact
question is treated depends on the decision of a court of last resort on an issue
of legal doctrine. The legal doctrine determines the purpose for which the fact
is material. He state&
The question what a prudent man would do under given circum-
stances is then equivalent to the question what are the teachings of
experience as to the dangerous character of this or that conduct under
these or those circumstances; and as the teachings of experience are
matters of fact, it is easy to see why the jury should be consulted with
regard to them. They are, however, facts of a special and peculiar
function. Their only bearing is on the question, what ought to have
been done or omitted under the circumstances of the case, not on
what was done. Their function is to suggest a rule of conduct.
Sometimes courts are induced to lay down rules by facts of a
more specific nature; as that the legislature passed a certain statute,
and that the case at bar is within the fair meaning of its words; or that
the practice of a specially interested class, or of the public at large,
has generated a rule of conduct outside the law which it is desirable
that the courts should recognize and enforce. These are matters of
fact, and have sometimes been pleaded as such. But as their only im-
portance is, that, if believed, they will induce the judges to lay down a
rule of conduct, or in other words a rule of law, suggested by them,
their tendency in most instances is to disappear as fast as the rules
suggested by them become settled. While the facts are uncertain, as
they are still only motives for decision upon the law,--grounds for
legislation, so to speak,--the judges may ascertain them in any way
which satisfies their conscience.
I am tempted to stop the quotation here. That would serve my immediate pur-
pose. I continue, however, in order to disclose in candor that the particular
point just stated, which is one I wish to emphasize, received less emphasis in
the original. Also, to be candid, I must call attention to the fact that elsewhere
in these remarks I have proposed some limits on the judge's conscience with
respect to ways of ascertaining premise facts. See, e.g., the Ninth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Principles, supra text accompanying notes 98-121. In any event, here
is the remainder of the paragraph in the middle of which I interrupted the
quotation:
Thus, courts recognize the statutes of the jurisdiction judicially,
although the laws of other jurisdictions, with doubtful wisdom, are
left to the jury. They may take judicial cognizance of a custom of
merchants. In former days, at least, they might inquire about it in
pai after a demurrer. They may act on the statement of a special
jury, as in the time of Lord Mansfield and his successors, or upon the
finding of a common jury based on the testimony of witnesses, as is
the practice today in this country. But many instances will be found
in the text-books which show that, when the facts are ascertained,
they soon cease to be referred to, and give place to a rule of law.
O.W. HOLMEs, JR., supra note 100, at 150-51 (footnotes omitted).
This theme was explored more recently, and explicitly in relation to the




The contrast between two distinct ways of using fact deter-
minations in the legal system is a significant fact about legal
systems. Although this particular terminology need not be
used, we need to recognize and consider the implications of the
phenomenon. This terminology is one helpful way of communi-
cating substantive ideas about the underlying phenomenon.
I emphasize, also, that I do not argue that substantive
choices about the whole complex of associated issues regarding
who decides, and how, must be decided in the same way for all
the different contexts in which premise-fact disputes arise.
Rather, what I present is a set of guiding principles and com-
mon practices. Even though good reason might exist for vari-
ances in particular circumstances, these principles and practices
express a prevailing tendency, the understanding of which con-
tributes materially to understanding law and the legal system.
"The history of the common law shows a constant pattern of ques-
tions once treated as fact growing into matters of law after the courts
have gained knowledge and experience concerning them." Korn,
Law, Fact, and Science in the Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1105
(1966). Thus, for example, the decision to admit into evidence novel
scientific testimony is first tested by individual adjudications before
judicial recognition eliminates the need for a preliminary foundation.
See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985).
Courts have even elevated the fact finding of a single jury verdict to
the position of legislative fact on which to base a rule of law. In all
instances of adjudicative facts' elevation to legislative facts, the prior
adjudications, with their full panoply of procedural protections, influ-
ence the court's view of reality. The legislative facts, in turn, influ-
ence the rule that is fashioned, and the due process clause does not
require individualized determination or reconsideration of the legisla-
tive facts in all subsequent cases.
In re Asbestos Litigation, 829 F.2d 1233, 1250 (3d Cir. 1987) (Becker, J., concur-
ring) (footnotes omitted), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1586 (1988).
Two footnotes to the passage just quoted add to this theme.
[A]lthough originally a subject to be re-established by expert testi-
mony in every case, courts long ago came to give blood-grouping tests
conclusive effect in paternity suits. See, e.g., Jordan v. Mace, 144 Me.
351, 69 A.2d 670 (1949); see generally Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as
Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L. REV. 466 (1958).
Id. at 1250 n.8.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142 (1888) (finding
on basis of prior jury decision that, as matter of law, certain game was
regulated "lottery"), cited in Korn, Law, Fact, and Science in the
Courts, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1080, 1104 (1966).
Id. at 1250 n.9.
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